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REMOTE CONTROL: TREATY REQUIREMENTS
FOR REGULATORY PROCEDURES
Paul Mertenskötter† & Richard B. Stewart‡
Modern trade agreements have come to include many and
varied obligations for domestic regulation and administration.
These treaty-based commitments aim primarily to improve the
freedom of firms to operate in the global economy by aligning
the ways in which governments regulate markets and private
actors engage governments through administrative law. They
therefore strike at the core of how economies are ordered and
entail important distributional questions. An increasingly
prevalent and diverse—but hitherto largely neglected—type of
treaty obligation prescribes specific procedures for domestic
administrative decision-making. This Article frames such requirements as tools of powerful states to control regulatory
decision-making by government officials in other states.
These obligations operate as instruments of transnational remote control by empowering private actors—predominantly
well-organized business interests—directly to use these procedures to pursue and defend their interests in other states. To
make this case, this Article for the first time synthesizes
McNollgast’s conception of regulatory procedures in the purely
domestic context as instruments of political control, and Putnam’s theorization of international treaty negotiations as a
two-level game. By applying this new synthesis to trade
agreements, this Article shows how procedural obligations
can be designed to stack the deck in favor of certain private
interests and why treaty negotiators may find it easier to
agree on procedures than substantive commitments. This Article uses its synthetic conception to explain the accelerating
rise of procedural requirements in post-war international economic law and demonstrates its explanatory potential by ana† Fellow, Institute for International Law and Justice, NYU Law School. We
are grateful to Anne van Aaken, Julian Arato, Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin,
Eyal Benvenisti, Benedict Kingsbury, Michael Livermore, Charles Sabel, Thomas
Streinz, and Joseph Weiler for thoughtful comments and discussions on earlier
drafts. Thanks also to participants at the MegaReg/IILJ workshops in New York
and Tokyo. All errors are our own. We are grateful to the Cornell Law Review
editors for their efforts. This Article grew out of the MegaReg project at the Institute for International Law and Justice at NYU Law School.
‡ University Professor; John Edward Sexton Professor of Law, NYU Law
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lyzing the variation between strong transnational regulatory
procedures for intellectual property rights and weak procedural protections for the environment in the revived Trans-Pacific
Partnership agreement.
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INTRODUCTION
Trade and regulatory agreements have been the vehicles
for the proliferation of a hitherto neglected type of inter-state
obligation: requirements to adopt specific domestic regulatory
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procedures.1 Not only have these commitments grown in prevalence—to thousands today, including far over a hundred in
the revived Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement2—but they
vary starkly in design and intensity both within the same, and
across different, agreements. We argue that obligations for domestic administrative law procedures are instruments negotiated by powerful states with the aim of controlling regulatory
decision-making by government officials in other states—they
are tools for remote control.3 We show how commitments for
procedures in treaties empower private actors—predominantly
well-organized transnational firms—to pursue and defend their
interests. For executive-branch officials negotiating treaties,
they are not only a means to satisfy their constituents’ specific
demands; they are also often easier to negotiate than substantive provisions.4 Our account helps to explain the rise of this
type of obligation as the regulatory state—and not tariffs—has
become the main concern for globally active business. It further allows us to make sense of variation among procedural
obligations in the same treaty as deliberate choices by negotiators to stack the deck in favor of some constituents while
largely paying only lip service to more diffuse social interests
such as those for environmental protection and labor rights.
This Article is foremost a critical exposition and reappraisal of the existing procedural infrastructure for private actors underpinning international economic ordering. Making
visible the power dimension in what at first sight seem to be
1
For exceptions, see Padideh Ala’i & Mathew D’Orsi, Transparency in International Economic Relations and the Role of the WTO, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
TRANSPARENCY 368, 371–73 (Ala’i & Robert Vaughn eds., 2014) (examining the use
of treaty-based transparency requirements for domestic regulators); Henrik Horn,
Petros C. Mavroidis & Erik N. Wijkstrom, In the Shadow of the DSU: Addressing
Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees, 47 J. WORLD TRADE
729, 732, 735 (2013) (discussing the Specific Trade Concerns mechanism as well
as the enquiry points as sites of economic governance).
2
See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Feb. 4, 2016, https://www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz
/text [https://perma.cc/2322-QMYP] [hereinafter TPP12].
3
We understand control as going beyond compliance and capturing more
complex interactions of legal obligations and politics, such as socialization,
agenda-setting, and general changes to the relative influence of different actors in
regulatory decision-making in other countries. See Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel,
Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters, 1 GLOBAL
POL’Y 127, 129–33 (2010) for a wide conception of international law’s influence on
state and individual action. See also Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, Political Power
Beyond the State: Problematics of Government, 43 BRIT. J. SOC. 173, 180–81
(1992) (discussing the idea of governance at a distance more generally); Gregory
Shaffer, How the World Trade Organization Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9 REG.
& GOVERNANCE 1, 3 (2015) (discussing multiple pathways for the World Trade
Organization’s rules and practices to influence state behavior).
4
See infra subpart I.H.
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arcane procedural details is the initial step in developing a
robust understanding of these instruments of global regulatory
governance. How these inter-state commitments for domestic
procedures function is not only theoretically significant but
carries practical and political importance.
To make our argument, we combine two hitherto separate
strands of political economy scholarship and apply them to the
study of international law and regulation.5 The first strand,
which Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast—
collectively, “McNollgast”—pioneered in the context of U.S. administrative law, understands rules of administrative procedure as instruments adopted by political principals to
influence decisions of their administrative agents in favor of
particular political constituencies. In return, these constituencies support them in reelection.6 The second strand, following
Putnam, conceives of the negotiation of international commitments as a two-level game in which negotiators need to arrive
at a deal that is acceptable in both the domestic and the international diplomatic arenas.7 Together, these two theories provide a framework for understanding the abundance and variety
of treaty requirements for regulatory procedures and their role
in global governance.
Commitments between states to adopt procedures that empower private actors to participate in domestic regulatory decision-making first prominently appeared in the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They have since steadily expanded through inclusion in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) agreements and subsequent bilateral and regional
trade agreements, especially those initiated by the United
States and the European Union.8 The Trans-Pacific Partner5
The burgeoning literature in this field includes EYAL BENVENISTI & GEORGE
W. DOWNS, BETWEEN FRAGMENTATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2017); DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER,
LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (Alberta Fabbricotti ed., 2016); Eyal
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and
the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007); David Kennedy, Law and the Political Economy of the World, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 7 (2013);
Katerina Linos & Jerome Hsiang, Modeling Domestic Politics in International Law
Scholarship, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).
6
See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 243,
261 (1987) [hereinafter McNollgast, Administrative Procedures].
7
See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 433–35 (1988) [hereinafter Putnam, Two-Level
Games].
8
See infra Part II.
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ship (TPP)—now going ahead with eleven countries but without
the United States as the rebranded Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)—is the latest manifestation of this trend, with states’ commitments to specific
regulatory procedures permeating the vast majority of its thirty
chapters and annexes.9
The large majority of procedural commitments in treaties
are responses to demands from private economic actors for
influence over government regulation in other states, although
labor and environmental groups have increasingly sought them
as well. Having started as generic Global Administrative Law
(GAL) requirements for transparency, participation, reason-giving, and review, procedural requirements have evolved into increasingly sophisticated and specific treaty commitments.
These requirements are often targeted toward particular interest groups and the substantive outcomes that they favor.10
They create winners and losers as different parts of domestic
regulatory decision-making are opened to different forms of
proceduralized influence by private actors pursuing their goals.
Business demand for such procedures has intensified as
tariffs have fallen and regulatory barriers to trade and investment assume relatively greater importance: the falling tide of
tariffs has exposed all the “snags and stumps” of justified or
unjustified, but in many instances, cross-jurisdictionally
unaligned, regulations which inhibit firms from freely operat-

9
See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Mar. 8, 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-andprogressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-text/ [https://perma.cc/
LV39-8RTR] [hereinafter CPTPP]; TPP12, supra note 2. We have compiled a table
with the procedural obligations in CPTPP we identified. It can be accessed at
https://www.iilj.org/megareg/remote-control/ [https://perma.cc/93GV-COHC].
10
On Global Administrative Law, see Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch &
Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 27–28, 31–35 (2005). The Global Administrative Project at NYU
Law starts from the premise that “[m]uch of global governance can be understood
as regulatory administration. Such regulatory administration is often organized
and shaped by principles of an administrative law character. Building on these
twin ideas, [its proponents] argue that a body of global administrative law is
emerging. This is the law of transparency, participation, review, and above all
accountability in global governance. [They] posit an increasingly discernible
‘global administrative space’ in which the strict dichotomy between domestic and
international has broken down, administrative functions are performed in complex relations between officials and institutions not organized in a single hierarchy, and regulation using non-binding forms often proves highly effective in
practice.” Project, INST. FOR INT’L L. AND JUST. AT N.Y.U. L., https://www.iilj.org/
gal/project/ [https://perma.cc/7M83-NKJC].

R
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ing across the global economy.11 The new dynamics of business organization, in which production and distribution
activities are unbundled and distributed over many jurisdictions but linked through global and regional value chains, have
further increased corporate demand for cross-jurisdictional
compatibility of regulatory rules and more open and better domestic regulatory governance.12
The innovation in information and communication technologies that enabled firms to deconstruct their activities while
building regional and global value chains has also dramatically
lowered the costs for organized interests to engage systematically with the regulatory administrations in multiple states.13
Without having to employ large numbers of people or needing a
physical presence, and by using e-mail and the World Wide
Web, organized interests act in strategic concert to collect,
comment on, and initiate the review of regulatory decisionmaking in capitals and local administrations all around the
world. Many globally active businesses are already familiar
with this type of regulatory process from their experiences with
such systems in the United States and Europe.14 Pharmaceu11
See ROBERT BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2 (1970)
(“[T]he lowering of tariffs has, in effect, been like draining a swamp. The lower
water level has revealed all the snags and stumps of non-tariff trade barriers that
still have to be cleared away.” (quoting B.A. Jones, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1968));
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., KEY Statistics and Trends in Trade
Policy 3 (2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab20132_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3J5B-8CTM] (“The last decade has seen the process of global
tariff liberalization continue largely unabated. Developed countries further reduced tariffs or maintained these at the very low levels of 2002, while the vast
majority of developing countries reduced their tariffs, in some cases quite
substantially.”).
12
See generally Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey & Timothy Sturgeon, The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 78, 79–82, 92 (2005)
(discussing the fragmentation of global production and how trade rules impact
global value chains); Richard Baldwin, Multilateralising 21st Century Regionalism,
OECD CONFERENCE PAPER 30–33 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/tad/events/
OECD-gft-2014-multilateralising-21st-century-regionalism-baldwin-paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2NB5-NEJH] [hereinafter Baldwin, Multilateralising Regionalism] (discussing the impact of divergent regulatory standards in global supply
chain trade).
13
See RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AND THE NEW GLOBALIZATION 81–84 (2016) (arguing for the fundamental importance
of information and communication technologies in the new dynamics of
globalization).
14
See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards
Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL.
128, 133–37 (2006) (for the United States); Adam William Chalmers, Trading
Information for Access: Informational Lobbying Strategies and Interest Group Access to the European Union, 20 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y, 41–43, 47–54 (2013) (for the
European Union).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN104.txt

2018]

unknown

REMOTE CONTROL

Seq: 7

10-JAN-19

11:53

171

tical trade organizations, for example, are often organized on a
national basis but in practice are global, sharing a largely identical membership of transnational companies. They participate
regularly and simultaneously in a myriad of regulatory
processes in different states as well as in global regulatory
bodies.15 Transnational environmental and labor groups attempt to follow the same strategy, albeit with far fewer resources.16 Due to these technological changes, the opening of
regulatory procedures to private actors through treaties is being extensively used to advance the interests of those that can
participate.
Taken as a whole, the various procedural requirements in
treaties are rooted in a globally diffusing model of regulatory
capitalism that emphasizes administrative law mechanisms to
secure facially neutral access to regulatory decision-making
and open government.17 In its interactions with the market,
the state’s role is to promote beneficial economic activity by
establishing an institutional framework to facilitate optimal allocation of resources, prevent market failures, and avert unlawful and arbitrary administrative decisions. To realize its
goals for an efficient market, regulatory capitalism—in its
Weberian ideal type—creates an “ecology of patterned niches”
by delegating significant authority from politicians to experts
and making use of new regulatory technologies such as the
regulatory-checks-regulator dynamics of regulatory impact assessments.18 As a result, the state has to grow with the mar15
See Deborah Gleeson et al., How the Transnational Pharmaceutical Industry Pursues Its Interests Through International Trade and Investment Agreements:
A Case Study of the Trans Pacific Partnership, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 223, 226, 243–48 (Alice De Jonge & Roman Tomasic eds.,
2017).
16
See Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics, 51 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 89, 92 (1999)
(noting the cost of international lobbying activity).
17
See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM: HOW IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR
MAKING IT WORK BETTER 20 (2008) (presenting a theoretical account of regulatory
capitalism and its critiques); David Levi-Faur, Regulatory Capitalism, in REGULATORY THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 289, 291–300 (Peter Drahos ed., 2017)
(giving an overview of the scholarship on regulatory capitalism); Jacint Jordana,
David Levi-Faur & Xavier Fernández i Marı́n, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory
Agencies: Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion, 44 COMP. POL. STUD. 1343,
1346–49, 1355–61 (2011) (showing the diffusion of the regulatory agency model
for the period 1966-2007); Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, The Diffusion of
Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: Sectoral and National Channels in the
Making of a New Order, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 102, 106–08 (2005)
(early work developing the concept of regulatory capitalism).
18
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 17, at xii.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN104.txt

172

unknown

Seq: 8

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

10-JAN-19

11:53

[Vol. 104:165

ket—rather than having one flourish at the cost of the other.19
In the evolving interface between the state’s administrative institutions and private economic actors that regulatory capitalism requires, administrative law enables procedural regulation
of the state by private actors.20
This Article proceeds in three Parts, with the first building
the theory that the second and third Parts use to explain the
rise of procedural requirements in treaties and the variation
among them in the TPP. Part I introduces McNollgast’s framework for understanding administrative procedures and extends
it to the transnational context by linking it to Putnam’s work on
the two-level game (sections A & B). We analyze different patterns of interest-group alignment, their role in the creation and
operation of treaty obligations for administrative decision-making, and discuss their implications for democratic decisionmaking (sections C, D, & E). We go on to show how domestic
and international review mechanisms can exacerbate or correct existing imbalances in access to procedures and their resulting distributional effects (section F). While the strong
attractions of procedural commitments for officials negotiating
treaties may explain their proliferation, they also have limitations as instruments of transnational control (sections G & H).
Part II explains the rise of procedural requirements in international economic agreements from the 1947 GATT to the Uruguay Round Agreements and the EU and U.S. trade
agreements of the 1990s and 2000s (sections A & B). We highlight the connections of exercising transnational control by way
of procedures in the EU and U.S. treaties with the workings of
regulatory capitalism (section C) and compare and contrast
procedural commitments for economic actors with those for
environment and labor interests (section D). Part III uses the
TPP’s diverse procedural commitments—left almost entirely
untouched in the CPTPP—as a case study and shows the analytical traction of our hypotheses by rationalizing the variation
between provisions for intellectual property rights—where procedural commitments are strong, and for environmental protection—where they are weak.

19
20

See id. at 25–26.
See id. at 21.
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I
REGULATORY PROCEDURES AS INSTRUMENTS OF
TRANSNATIONAL CONTROL
Proceduralized regulatory governance provisions in international agreements can be understood and theorized by joining two classic works of political economy scholarship:
McNollgast’s conceptualization of regulatory procedures as instruments of political control in domestic government, and Putnam’s framing of international negotiations as a two-level
game.21 This synthesis explains and illuminates the growing
use in international agreements of administrative law mechanisms for governance at a distance to control regulatory decision-making in other countries, a major phenomenon which
has nonetheless received scant scholarly attention.
A. Extending McNollgast to the Transnational Setting
McNollgast, applying positive political theory, views legislation in a democracy as a ‘deal’ by legislators to target benefits to
constituencies in return for their support.22 Ideally, the deal
should be stable and remain faithfully implemented over a long
time in order to deliver commensurately greater benefits. In
the language of principal–agent frameworks, the administrative
officials tasked with implementations are the agents, and the
political actors are the principal(s).23 As in any other principal–agent relationship, the principals will incur agency costs
from the delegation due to the agents’ differing agendas and
interests and the principals’ attempts to curb agency “slack”
and ensure the agents’ conformity to the terms of the delegation.24 The principals will seek to minimize total agency costs
through the mechanisms of control and the incentives at their
disposal.
To channel administrative officials’ discretion, the political
principals can directly monitor agency performance and take
corrective measures, including through hearings, budgetary
21
See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 6, at 273–74; Putnam, Two-Level Games, supra note 7.
22
See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 6, at 247; Mathew
D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, The Political Economy of Law:
Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies
21–22 (SIEPR, Discussion Paper No. 04-35, 2005) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Political Theory of Law].
23
For a good overview of the positive political theory account of administrative procedures, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1767 (2007).
24
See McNollgast, Positive Political Theory of Law, supra note 22, at 108.

R
R
R
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adjustments, or statutory changes.25 Direct oversight, however, is costly for legislators who have limited time and political
resources. They can also seek to narrow the terms of the delegation, but this runs up against the need for legislative compromise and inability to predict future circumstances. Figure 1
shows these direct instruments of political control of the bureaucratic actors.
FIGURE 1: MCNOLLGAST’S FRAMEWORK FOR DOMESTIC PROCEDURES
Control through monitoring,
sanctions, and adoption of procedures
mobilized by private actors.

Political Principal

Economic
Interest 1

Economic
Interest 2

Statutory
Delegation

Social
Interest 3

Regulatory Agency

Procedures

McNollgast’s major contribution is to identify an alternative control strategy: political principals can establish administrative procedures that private actors can mobilize to pursue
their own interests in ways that are aligned with those of the
principals by ensuring officials’ adherence to the terms of delegation.26 Figure 1 also includes this procedural control mechanism. Private actors are given procedural rights to require
agencies to act transparently, to submit evidence and argument to the agency as it formulates policy, and to receive reasons for the agency’s decisions. These rights can be used not
25

See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 6, at 248–53.
See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 6, at 273–74.
McNollgast developed this theory in line with their long-standing line of argument
that the legislature has effective control over the regulatory state. See id. at
248–49; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The “Reformation of
Administrative Law” Revisited, 31 J. L. ECON & ORG. 782, 782 (2015) (arguing for
“the critical role of Congress and the President in the reformation” of U.S. administrative law).
26

R
R
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only to generate information that will activate political principals but also to empower private actors to directly assert their
interests before the agency. Private actors also have access to
judicial review to correct unlawful or simply unresponsive decisions by administrative officials. This arrangement demonstrates how, as Croley noted, “rules that affect how all other
regulatory decisions will be made constitute one crucial set of
regulatory outcomes.”27
Crucially, the political principals can manipulate the administrative process to ‘stack the deck’ toward favored interest
groups by specifying a particular agency to implement a program or a particular design for agencies’ decision-making.28
Political principals can design regulatory procedures either as
effective or deliberately ineffective instruments for implementing the underlying substantive deal, thereby choosing to enforce effectively or underenforce the substantive obligations in
question. Varying the procedural set-up, resources, information required, and burdens of proof can operate as more finegrained and targeted deck-stacking by changing the relative
influence of different constituents on decisional outcomes.
For political principals, controlling agents through procedures mobilized by private actors has further benefits.
Whereas political officials may not know what specific policy
outcome their constituents will want under uncertain future
conditions, they are likely to know which constituencies they
want to empower procedurally.29 The constituents will know
best what is in their interest under changing circumstances
and can use their procedurally privileged position to that end.
Under this arrangement, the political principals also do not
incur further monitoring and control costs and alleviate the
political risk of ending up on the “wrong side” of a controversial
substantive issue.
We extend McNollgast’s conception of administrative procedures as instruments of political control to international regulatory and economic governance. In the face of intensifying
global interdependencies, economic and civil society actors are
increasingly interested in regulatory decision-making in countries around the world.30 Private actors who wish to influence
27
Stephen P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 88 (1998).
28
See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 6, at 255.
29
See id. at 263–64.
30
See Baldwin, Multilateralising Regionalism, supra note 12, at 6–20
(presenting the fundamental changes in the global organization of production and
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decisions in other countries can lobby and try to mobilize their
own domestic political officials to influence governments and
regulatory officials in other countries. But this approach has
serious limitations. Because the political officials in one’s own
country (State A) are not in a principal–agent relationship with
the regulatory officials in another country (State B), many of
the instruments of control available to political officials in the
domestic context are unavailable cross-nationally. Political actors in State A have no oversight, appointment, disciplinary, or
budgetary powers regarding officials in State B; these are the
prerogative of political principals in State B.31 A strategy
whereby political officials in State A seek directly to influence
regulatory decision-making in State B therefore runs up
against generic problems of informational asymmetries and low
detection rates, exacerbated by the international legal order’s
foundational norms of sovereignty and non-interference.32
These limitations may be partially overcome if the parties
to an agreement establish an international institution that
oversees implementation of an international agreement. Examples include the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism and
the Specific Trade Concerns mechanism that the WTO’s SPS
and TBT Committees administer.33 Also, an ex post control
decreases in tariff levels that make domestic regulations key determinants of
competitiveness and the incidence of costs and benefits of economic activity).
31
Established political relationships, overseas development assistance, large
export markets, etc. do, of course, also function as important levers of influence.
See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 19–35 (2012) (providing examples of the global influence of EU regulation); Ngaire Woods, Whose Aid?
Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance, 84 INT’L AFF. 1205, 1216–18 (2008) (critiquing the practice of
established overseas development assistant donors who have frequently required
that the recipient governments “adopt specific economic policies and targets” to
receive aid).
32
The tension inherent between the governance structures operating in the
real world and the legal concepts international law has used to explain them has
long been recognized. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND
CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68–70 (2006) (drawing attention to
the difficulties in applying traditional concepts of sovereignty to the real, globalized world in which individual traders are the major protagonists and ultimate
subjects of regulation); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 36–40, 61–64
(2004) (showing the disconnect between traditional conceptions of foreign office
diplomacy and the manifold international links between different parts of each
state); Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 599,
610–18 (1998) (tracing the neglect of inequality as a global issue to the concept of
sovereignty in international legal scholarship).
33
See Horn, Mavroidis & Wijkstrom, supra note 1, at 732, 735 (examining
STCs); Richard B. Stewart & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The World Trade
Organization: Multiple Dimensions of Global Administrative Law, 9 INT’L J. CON.
LAW. 556, 566, 584 (2011) (discussing the Trade Policy Review Body as a site of
economic governance).
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strategy might be to set up traditional state-to-state dispute
settlement mechanisms.34 The extent of State B’s consent to
these types of control is, however, likely to be limited, and
enforcement concerns are prone to persist.35
Following McNollgast, another way for political actors in
one country (State A) to establish influence over bureaucratic
action in State B is to negotiate in international agreements for
regulatory procedures which directly empower private actors in
State A in the processes of State B’s regulatory decision-making. Figure 2 shows this extension of the McNollgast framework to the transnational context.
FIGURE 2: EXTENDING MCNOLLGAST’S FRAMEWORK TO
TRANSNATIONAL PROCEDURES
State A
Negotiated
Procedure

Political Actor
State B

Social
Interest
4
Bureaucratic
Actor
State B

Political Actor
State A

Economic
Interest 5
Economic
Interest 1

Economic
Interest 2

Social
Interest 3

Procedures

State B

To ensure, even at a distance, that their and their constituencies’ preferences are satisfied, the political actors of State A
negotiating international commitments (ordinarily, but not
necessarily, in the treaty form) can require State B’s regulators
34
See Benedict Kingsbury, International Courts: Uneven Judicialisation in
Global Order, in The CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 203, 205–15
(James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012) (taking stock of international
courts and tribunals and highlighting the large variation in issues and states
subject to their jurisdiction).
35
See Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO Dispute Settlement,
Transparency and Surveillance, 23 WORLD ECON. 527, 529–33 (2002) (highlighting
systemic issues which hamper even enforcement of the highly legalized WTO
dispute settlement process).
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to follow procedures of transparency, participation, reason-giving, and review. These Global Administrative Law technologies
can operate as instruments of transnational control by enabling private parties to secure compliance with State A laws or
with the substantive deal in the treaty, by channeling administrative discretion, creating a more open system of regulatory
governance based on reasons, and incubating communities of
practice.36 Review mechanisms can augment this strategy of
transnational control. These can include existing or newly created domestic courts or international courts and tribunals
which either allow private actors direct access or make use of
traditional state-to-state dispute settlement via diplomatic
espousals.37
B. Negotiating for Procedures in the Context of Putnam’s
Two-Level Game
In our extension of the McNollgast model, the central venue
for establishing transnational procedural obligations are interstate negotiations for economic regulatory agreements.38 The
negotiations will involve higher officials from two (A and B) or
more states who may have different domestic constituencies
with differing interests regarding the appropriate role of such
procedures.
Putnam powerfully analyzed the political economy of such
negotiations.39 International agreements are negotiated principally by states’ central executives, which in his model are taken
to act rationally and strategically. The negotiators’ decision
environment can be understood as a two-level game—at one
level international diplomacy, at the other domestic politics.40
In this game,
36
See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 10, at 37–42 (detailing the
features of Global Administrative Law); infra subpart I.E (discussing these four
functions in detail).
37
See infra subpart I.G.
38
Our theory can also be applied, mutatis mutandis, to other treaties and
even softer instruments of global governance such as MOUs.
39
See Putnam, Two-Level Games, supra note 7, at 434.
40
See id. Recourse to the two-level game analysis is finding wider application
in international legal scholarship. See, e.g., Anne van Aaken & Joel P.
Trachtman, Political Economy of International Law: Towards a Holistic Model of
State Behaviour, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 9, 21–26 (Alberta Fabbricotti ed., 2016); Eyal Benvenisti, The Political
Economy of International Lawmaking by National Courts, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 258, 260–61 (Alberta Fabbricotti
ed., 2016).
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[e]ach national political leader appears at both game boards.
Across the international table sit his foreign counterparts,
and at his elbows sit diplomats and other international advisors. Around the domestic table behind him sit party and
parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies,
representatives of key interest groups, and the leader’s own
political advisors.41

The task for the negotiating political actors is to compose
an agreement that can be accepted at all tables according to
each table’s decisional rules. The international decision rule is
most commonly that of consensus, whereas domestically, the
rules and practices vary among political systems. Constitutional and statutory requirements, regard for the public’s preferences, as well as dynamics of coalition-building among
powerful constituencies close to the executive branch all factor
into the calculus, along with the need for legislative ratification
in cases where it is required.42 The key insight for our purposes from Putnam’s two-level game is to think about commitments at the international level that will also satisfy the
demands of the domestic tables. For reasons discussed below,
we argue that the two-level game character of the negotiation
process often makes agreement on domestic regulatory procedures more attractive than substantive commitments.43
Domestically, the decision environment of international
negotiations often deviates significantly from ordinary legislation and regulation. The realm of diplomacy has long been
considered to have its own logic and has often been protected
from domestic administrative law requirements through avoidance doctrines and exemptions.44 Treaty negotiations have
traditionally been confidential with limited or no roles for the
legislature or courts before their conclusion. In the view of
Benvenisti & Downs, this protection of the international domain from standard domestic controls on government has
made the decisions at the domestic table particularly vulnerable to capture by organized interest groups.45
Kaminski’s work on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office,
for example, shows how the exemption of the realm of diplo41

Putnam, Two-Level Games, supra note 7, at 434.
See id. at 434–37.
43
See infra subpart I.H.
44
See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1919–34 (2015) (tracing the development of
U.S. foreign relations law doctrine to shield diplomacy from the standard strictures of domestic law).
45
See BENVENISTI & DOWNS, supra note 5, at 55.
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macy from standard regulatory strictures such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA), and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) due to
an asserted need of secrecy in negotiations may, compared to
standard domestic policy decisions, significantly favor participation and influence of organized economic interests.46 By
contrast, the publication of proposed negotiating texts or descriptions of the state of play as used by the European Union in
the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) altered the strategic interactions at the domestic and international tables by allowing otherwise uninformed and excluded interest groups to review the ‘state of play’
and to mobilize for changes in the draft texts.47
While in most cases it is inevitable for the executive to take
the leading role in foreign affairs—including in treaty negotiations—the precise institutional arrangements for the negotiation process affect the extent to which different interests have a
say and, ultimately, diplomacy’s substantive outcomes.
C. Interest Alignment at Putnam’s Tables
Crucial elements in our translation of McNollgast to the
transnational context are the configuration of private actors
with an interest in the negotiations and their degree of influence with different states’ governments’ executives. Along one
dimension, private actors in States A and B that have an interest in the regulatory action in State B can be roughly divided
into economic interests and environmental or social interests (as
shown in Figure 2). Social and environmental interest groups
take a strong interest in regulatory administration both at
home and abroad, aware that their concerns are often disregarded at the decisional or implementation stages of state ac46
Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law
Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 994–98 (2014); see also
Robert Gulotty, Structuring Participation: Public Comments and the Dynamics of
US Trade Negotiations, in MEGAREGULATION CONTESTED: GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDERING
AFTER TPP (Benedict Kingsbury et al. eds., forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5–8)
(on file with authors) (detailing the asymmetric participation dynamics in the U.S.
negotiation process for trade agreements).
47
See Evelyn Coremans, From Access to Documents to Consumption of Information: The European Commission Transparency Policy for the TTIP Negotiations, 5
POL. & GOVERNANCE 29, 32–36 (2017) (showing how the provision of transparency
can generate procedural changes and impact interinstitutional relationship); see
also European Commission, EU Negotiating Texts in TTIP (July 14, 2016), http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230 [https://perma.cc/7QNNSST9] (giving access to the EU’s “transparency initiative”—it is interesting to note
that the later, and now concluded, negotiations between the EU and Japan did
not follow this approach).
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tion. They often advocate for and seek to use Global
Administrative Law procedures in order to help address these
problems.48 Drawing on Olson’s foundational insight and the
work of Benvenisti & Downs, one would, however, expect that
organized economic interests are not only better equipped to
demand but also to make use of transnational procedural
rights.49 Collective action problems may be further exacerbated in the transnational administrative space, where greater
coordination and more resources are needed to effectively influence regulatory action in other states.50 Environmental and
social actors may often lack the resources, internal organization, and incentives to use these procedures as effectively as
businesses.51 For this reason, even facially neutral treaty commitments regarding domestic regulatory procedures may, on
balance, favor organized economic interests.52
48

See BENVENISTI & DOWNS, supra note 5, at 63.
See BENVENISTI & DOWNS, supra note 5, at 56–65 (discussing the impacts of
interest-group activity in domestic politics on international law); MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 132–35,
165–67 (1965) (developing a general theory explaining the structural advantage in
the policy process of concentrated (economic) interests compared to diffuse (social) interests).
50
See, e.g., Alexander Cooley & James Ron, The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action, 27 INT’L SECURITY 5, 9–13 (2002) (arguing that the growth of internationally active NGOs has
intensified competition, noncooperation, and opportunistic behavior).
51
See John Gerard Ruggie, Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority, and Relative Autonomy, 2017 REG. & GOV. 1, 5–7 (discussing the uneven
dynamics of global business lobbying); see also Melissa J. Durkee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201, 229 (2017) (demonstrating how businesses use “front
groups” to appear as varying forms of civil-society organizations in the international legal process to strategically advance their interests).
52
There is a growing empirical literature on the distributional impacts of the
U.S.’s notice-and-comment rulemaking process. See Brian Libgober & Daniel
Carpenter, Lobbying with Lawyers: Financial Market Evidence for Banks’ Influence on Rulemaking, WASHINGTON CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 2–4 (Jan. 2018),
http://cdn.equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/12152606/
01162018-WP-lobbying-w-lawyers1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PHZ8-E7G6] (studying commenting activity on Dodd-Frank related rulemaking and linking it to between $3.2 and $7 billion in excess returns of publicly traded banks in the postDodd-Frank era); Simon F. Haeder & Susan Webb Yackee, Influence and the
Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President’s Office of Management and
Budget, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 507, 516–19 (2015) (finding that lobbying of the
Office of Management and Budget at the time of its review of regulations is associated with changes to these rules—and finding more influence of business groups
compared to public interest groups); Yackee & Yackee, supra note 14, at 133–35
(finding that business commenters, but not nonbusiness commenters, hold important influence over the content of final rules through submission of comments
in the U.S. notice-and-comment rulemaking process). For a recent study of effects of lobbying the White House directly, see Jeffrey R. Brown & Jiekun Huang,
All the President’s Friends: Political Access and Firm Value 26 (NBER, Working
Paper No. 23356, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23356 [https://
49
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A second distinction is whether the private actors with an
interest in regulatory decisions in State B are insiders (i.e. from
State B) or outsiders (i.e. from State A or a third state). Interstate commitments for domestic regulatory procedures are
likely to be more helpful to outsiders than to insiders who
already have contacts and access to information from local
officials. Procedures may realign the playing field by eroding
the benefits that insiders can gather from their local connections. Examples of how Global Administrative Law may benefit
outsiders are the WTO TBT Agreement’s requirement for member states to notify draft technical regulations and to establish
local enquiry points through which outside actors can comment on them, and the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (and even more so its 2012 revised version) mandating
detailed publication of tenders and standardized application
processes.53
In other situations, it may also be that insiders—including
both political principals and private actors—have an interest in
establishing administrative law procedures via treaty commitment to work as instruments of control over regulatory administrators, even when outside private actors mobilize those
procedures. Political principals may embrace this strategy in
order to implement both substantive and procedural reforms in
domestic regulatory policies and governance, and overcome political or bureaucratic resistance. This objective is evident in
the Abe administration’s interest in TPP, including championing it after the U.S. government withdrew.54 It may also have
perma.cc/DPD9-7AW5] (finding that “corporate executives’ meetings with key
policymakers [at the White House] are associated with positive abnormal stock
returns” and regulatory relief for their companies).
53
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 10, annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868
U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT Agreement]; Agreement on Government Procurement, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization arts.
IX–XI, annex 4, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 194; Revised Agreement on Government Procurement arts. VI, VII, X, & XVI, annex to the Protocol Amending the
Agreement on Government Procurement, Mar. 30, 2012, https://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/rev-gpr-94_01_e.htm [https://perma.cc/QA2V-EQQR].
For discussions, see Horn, Mavroidis & Wijkstrom, supra note 1, at 733 n.9
(explaining the TBT’s “enquiry point[ ]” requirement); Christopher McCrudden &
Stuart G. Gross, WTO Government Procurement Rules and the Local Dynamics of
Procurement Policies: A Malaysian Case Study, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151, 158,
168–70, 178–79 (2006) (discussing several countries’ attempts to secure exemptions from coverage of the WTO GPA for certain social policies, including the
effects of transparency norms on Malaysian procurement practices, which have a
redistributional dimension).
54
See Christina Davis, Japan: Interest Group Politics, Foreign Policy Linkages,
and the TPP, in MEGAREGULATION CONTESTED: GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDERING AFTER TPP
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been a factor in decisions by other countries to join. The logic
is analogous to that followed by China joining the WTO, with its
strong system of state-to-state dispute settlement.55 Moreover,
local private interests—both economic and environmental or
social—dissatisfied with the regulatory policies and administrative state in their own country, may want to enlist transnational actors to police its decisions. Especially in contexts
where the capacity and internal regulatory coherence of government is more limited, or where alliances between private
economic interests and domestic regulators block socially desirable competition and integration, the remote-control strategy may be seen as a promising avenue to attract foreign direct
investment and business activity by improving transparency
and predictability and ensuring compliance with substantive
disciplines on state policies and measures. By such means,
the two-level negotiating game may be used as a form of reverse
judo.
In other contexts, insiders and outsiders may share common interests, for example when they are members of the same
industry or have the same environmental concern. As Putnam
notes, an important feature of treaty negotiations is the alignment or even identity of certain economic or social interests
across different state parties.56 These may join forces and create transnational coalitions that succeed in binding their respective states through international treaty obligations when
the ordinary domestic legislation or rulemaking processes
would be unavailing.57 Embedding measures in international
agreements is particularly attractive because states’ international legal obligations are difficult to change due to the need of
all other state parties to agree to modifications or terminations.58 This lock-in effect, and the corresponding political
benefits for principals—and the interest groups with which
they are aligned—are even greater than in the domestic setting,
where future legislation can undo past deals. Where treaty
obligations already exist, like-minded insiders and outsiders

14–19 (Benedict Kingsbury et al. eds., forthcoming 2019) (manuscript on file with
author).
55
See Henry Gao, The WTO Transparency Obligations and China, 12 J. COMP.
L. 329, 338–40 (2017).
56
See Putnam, Two-Level Games, supra note 7, at 444 (“[T]ransnational
alignments may emerge, tacit or explicit, in which domestic interests pressure
their respective governments to adopt mutually supportive policies.”).
57
See id.
58
See BENVENISTI & DOWNS, supra note 5, at 72.
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may use the available procedures to influence domestic regulatory policies in a strategically orchestrated fashion.
The insider/outsider distinction can therefore mask significant alignment, or even active coalitions, between groups in
different countries, creating alignments of transnational coalitions of private corporate interests against general publics.59
An example is the group of large multinational proprietary
pharmaceutical companies, each with a large network of local
subsidiaries.60 Subsidiaries of such firms in State A and B
may appropriately be thought of as the same interests using
their influence with executives in both states to push for treaty
commitments that empower them in the regulatory processes
of both States A and B.
Another twist is that private actors with no affiliation with
either State A or State B will likely be able to make use of the
procedural commitments arising under an agreement between
the two states. TPP is an example: even though the United
States is not a party to the agreement, firms and civil society
groups from around the world, including from the United
States, may be given new procedural rights in the administrative processes of the eleven treaty parties as a direct result of
TPP. The extent to which private actors with no affiliation to
the treaty parties stand to gain from the procedural commitments will depend on the treaty language and exact content of
the implementing legislation or regulation in each case. But
the TPP treaty provisions we survey in Part IV do in the majority
of cases grant rights to “interested persons,” rather than, e.g.,
“interested persons of the Parties.”61 In the cases where they
are explicitly more restrictive, the rights involved commonly
concern environmental and labor governance, suggesting governments are aware that private interests from third parties
may use these obligations.62 Most favored-nation treatment
59

We are grateful to Eyal Benvenisti for these suggestions.
See Gleeson et al., supra note 15, at 226, 229.
61
See, e.g., TPP12, supra note 2, at art. 8.7.5 (“Each Party shall ensure that
its proposals contain sufficient detail about the likely content of the proposed
technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures to adequately inform interested persons and other Parties about whether and how their trade
interests might be affected.”) & 27.2.2(g) (“The Commission may . . . seek the
advice of non-governmental persons or groups on any matter falling within the
Commission’s functions . . . .”). But see id. at art. 8.7.1 (“Each Party shall allow
persons of another Party to participate in the development of technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures by its central government bodies on terms no less favourable than those that it accords its own
persons.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (a more restrictive provision)).
62
See Jan Klabbers, Megaregionals: Protecting Third Parties? 2–5 (MEGAREG,
Forum Paper No. 2016/1, 2016) (discussing the general principle of pacta tertiis
60
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arising under the WTO Agreements may also require states to
open these regulatory processes to private actors from WTO
countries equally.63 If only for reasons of simple administration, it is likely that the procedural commitments will often be
implemented on a nondiscriminatory basis.64 Furthermore,
some benefits of procedures such as publication are unlikely to
be excludable. The circumstances may give actors from nonparty countries an incentive to try to influence the negotiation
of an agreement through coalitions with actors from the party
countries or otherwise.
Ultimately, whether the framing of economic vs. environmental/social interests, insiders vs. outsiders, or transnational
actors vs. general publics has more analytical purchase is
likely to depend on the exact regulatory struggle at issue, the
existing coalitions of interests, and their fault lines across and
within states, as well as the extent of influence by organized
economic actors over the different state executives in the different negotiating countries.
D. Implications for Democratic Decision-Making
In light of this analysis, the dominance of the executive in
international affairs and the proliferation of international
agreements carry negative implications for the democratic legitimacy of procedures as instruments of transnational control
by fencing out legislatures and courts. This situation stands in
contrast to the conclusions of McNollgast’s original analysis,
which was concerned with the influence of elected officials (and
indirectly, coalitions of voters and organized interests reflected
in election outcomes) on the administrative state and bureaucratic politics. In the McNollgast model, regulatory procedures
mandated by legislation are a mechanism by which elected
officials can exercise control over the rulemaking process, and
therefore bolster the democratic legitimacy of bureaucratic action.65 Our extension of their framework to the transnational
nec nocent nec prosunt in international law, which generally does not allow treaty
commitments to create rights and obligations for states not parties to the treaty).
63
See Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation, Regional Trade Agreements,
and World Trade Law: Conflict or Complementarity?, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
137, 142–43, 151 (2015) (arguing that the GATT’s MFN guarantee is not covered
by the art. XXIV exception with respect to non-tariff measures.)
64
Examples here include single-window customs administration, rights of
review in national courts, or publication.
65
McNollgast, Positive Political Theory of Law, supra note 22, at 17. That is
not to say that McNollgast do not themselves acknowledge the limits of this
justification in the light of collective action problems. McNollgast, Administrative
Procedures, supra note 6, at 274 (“Of course, not every group will be included in
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context cuts in the opposite direction. Where regulatory procedures and other provisions are negotiated among executive officials in the process of treaty-making, the measures may not be
democratically legitimated and reflect the preferences of transnationally active, organized interests with good connections to
the respective executive branches of government rather than
those of general publics. While legislatures may often better
represent general publics, as political principals, they have a
harder time controlling the executive as their agent in the
transnational setting.66
This concern is exacerbated in instances where international agreements do not require legislative approval either for
the ratification of the treaty or for implementing legislation.
But even where there is a further legislative step, the nature of
the “package deal” and limited influence over the specifics
where legislatures are veto-players rather than agenda-setters
may result in outcomes that tilt against the interests of general
publics and are driven by coalitions of transnationally active
economic actors in powerful states.67 Even where the legislature is involved in treaty-making before ratification, as in the
United States’ fast-track procedure for economic treaties, its
guidance often remains general.68 Forced to leave space for the
give-and-take of the inter-state negotiations, the legislature’s
delegation of authority to the executive gives the latter wide
discretion.69 In the case of TPP’s fast-track legislation, for example, the high variation in the strength of procedural requirean agency’s environment. Influence will be accorded to those represented in the
coalition that gave rise to the agency’s organic statute. Well-organized special
interests and the parochial interests of congressional districts will be well represented. Interests of a national constituency that is not well organized will not
achieve representation unless it is built into the agency’s process. And this will
occur only if these broader interests are influential with elected politicians, usually because they are electorally significant. Thus, in the end, the politics of the
bureaucracy will mirror the politics surrounding Congress and the president.”).
66
We are grateful to Eyal Benvenisti for this suggestion.
67
See Iain Osgood, Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support
for US Trade Agreements, 72 INT’L ORG. 455, 480–81 (2018) (pointing out that
multinational companies’ size and resources gives them a political advantage over
the ordinary consumer in lobbying members of Congress to pass agreements);
Iain Osgood & Yilang Feng, Intellectual Property Provisions and Support for US
Trade Agreements, 13 REV. INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (2018) (recognizing that “US trade
agreements have served mainly to advance the interests of a relatively elite group
of firms who own significant intellectual property assets such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks”).
68
See IAN F. FERGUSON, CONG. RES. SERV., TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA)
AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 11 (2015) (outlining the types of negotiation objectives included in Congressional Trade Promotion Authority legislation).
69
Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 143, 170 (1992) (“Agreements enacted under the Fast Track thus
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ments between different issue areas and interests that we
discuss further below was not reflected in the legislative guidance.70 It was only in the ultimate treaty text resulting from
inter-executive negotiations that procedural deck-stacking became evident.71
These democracy concerns have added force in light of the
popular backlash in the United States and parts of Europe
against international economic arrangements, negotiated and
overseen by elites, which are perceived to and may very likely in
fact provide disproportionate benefits to large business and
financial institutions and wealthy individuals, while imposing
disruptive costs on less advantaged groups.
E. Four Functions of Inter-State Commitments to
Domestic Regulatory Procedures
Irrespective of which type of interests they seek to empower, Global Administrative Law procedures can influence administrative decision-making and secure the interests of
private actors in four different ways. These functions are the
means through which control can be exerted at a distance.
First, procedures can help to ensure compliance by state
officials with the substantive commands and requirements of
domestic law and of the international legal obligations applicable to their actions. Procedures generate information for the
political branches as well as interested private parties to learn
about the details of regulatory action, the reasons for it, and
the underlying evidence. In the TPP agreement, for example,
parties commit to requiring their telecommunications regulators to publish “an explanation of the purpose of and reasons”
tend to reflect the President’s trade priorities and agenda more closely than
Congress’.”).
70
See infra subpart III.B.
71
See Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of
2015, H.R. 2146, 114th Cong. (2015) (“Regulatory practices—The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding the use of government regulation
or other practices to reduce market access for United States goods, services, and
investments are—(A) to achieve increased transparency and opportunity for the
participation of affected parties in the development of regulations; (B) to require
that proposed regulations be based on sound science, cost benefit analysis, risk
assessment, or other objective evidence; (C) to establish consultative mechanisms
and seek other commitments, as appropriate, to improve regulatory practices and
promote increased regulatory coherence . . . (F) to achieve the elimination of
government measures such as price controls and reference pricing which deny
full market access for United States products; (G) to ensure that government
regulatory reimbursement regimes are transparent, provide procedural fairness,
are nondiscriminatory, and provide full market access for United States products
. . . .”).
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for any proposed regulatory action.72 The generation of information has a self-regulating function by incentivizing regulators to adhere to the law applicable to them and to be mindful
of public concerns. Information can moreover mobilize direct
control by political principals. The information may provide a
basis for judicial review, initiated by private parties, of administrative decisions if the agency nonetheless deviates.73 It may
also help private actors to mobilize political support from other
governments that can approach the decision-making states’
political principals on their behalf.74
A second function of procedures stems from the inevitable
ambiguities in laws, regulations, and treaties resulting from
the need to reach a compromise and the uncertainty of future
circumstances. Such ambiguity necessarily affords interpretive discretion to the public officials to whom implementation is
delegated.75 Obliging these officials to make decisions according to specific procedures that guarantee access to information
and responsiveness to comments from the public can influence
their exercise of discretion. The change in outcomes is likely to
slant toward the interests of those private parties that use the
procedures. This function is reflected in the requirement in the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union to “ensure that transparency procedures regarding the development of technical
regulations . . . allow interested persons of the Parties to participate at an early appropriate stage when amendments can
still be introduced and comments taken into account.”76 Similar commitments abound in many international economic regulatory agreements.77
72

TPP12, supra note 2, at art. 13.22.1(b).
See id.
74
See Richard B. Stewart, Global Standards for National Societies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 175, 185 (Sabino Cassese ed.,
2016) [hereinafter Stewart, Global Standards].
75
In the context of global governance, delegation also occurs between global
regulatory actors and national administrators. Analogously to the domestic context, the global actors may develop more specific and concrete regulatory norms to
reduce discretion. Id.
76
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, art. 4.6,1 Oct.
30, 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/
tradoc_152806.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y9T-T7PK] [hereinafter CETA].
77
See, e.g., United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement art. 19.2(b),
May 12, 2012 (“To the extent possible, each Party shall: . . . provide interested
persons and Parties a reasonable opportunity to comment on . . . proposed [regulatory] measures.”); European Union-South Korea Free Trade Agreement art.
12.3.2, Sept. 16, 2010 (“Each Party shall: (a) endeavour to publish in advance any
measure of general application that it proposes to adopt or to amend, including an
explanation of the objective of, and rationale for the proposal; (b) provide reasona73
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Third, the systematic, predictable, and consistent application of these procedures throughout a state’s administration
can foster an open regulatory system in which private actors
can operate with lower uncertainty and risk. In pursuing “freedom to operate,” multinational businesses prefer on balance to
locate operations in jurisdictions with systems of open and
sound regulatory governance.78 In their cumulative effects,
practices of transparency, participation, reason-giving, and review can significantly improve the legibility of a regulatory
state, especially to less informed outside actors, and root out
informal capture.79 They can help the overall rationality of
regulation and root out discriminatory or protectionist regulatory measures. This is of significant interest to transnational
economic actors who seek to continuously maximize allocative
efficiency along their global value chains (GVCs).80 Over the
long-term, these procedures may enhance firms’ freedom to
operate transnationally by driving processes of overall crosspolity regulatory alignment. By regulatory alignment we mean
the promotion in compatibility of “regulatory institutions and
practices” among states to facilitate cross-national business
and market structures, without requiring strict harmonization
or mutual recognition of the standards and regulations of different jurisdictions.81
The consequences of a domestic regulatory process incorporating Global Administrative Law procedures will depend not
only on their supply but also on the nature of the demand for
ble opportunities for interested persons to comment on such proposed measure,
allowing, in particular, for sufficient time for such opportunities; and (c) endeavour to take into account the comments received from interested persons with
respect to such proposed measure.”).
78
See Dan Ciuriak, Generalized Freedom to Operate 2–4 (MEGAREG, Forum
Paper No. 2016/3, 2016), https://www.iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
Ciuriak_IILJ-MegaRegForumPaper_2016-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BK2-6GAJ].
79
Richard B. Stewart, The Normative Dimensions and Performance of Global
Administrative Law, 13 INT’L J. CON. L. 499, 500–02 (2015) (discussing the benefits from improved regulatory performance that Global Administrative Law may
induce).
80
See Donald Robertson, The Regulation of Firms in Globally Intertwined
Markets: The Case of Payment Systems, in CONTESTED MEGAREGULATION: GLOBAL
ECONOMIC ORDERING AFTER TPP (Benedict Kingsbury et al. eds., forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 3) (on file with authors).
81
Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Trans-Pacific Partnership as Megaregulation,
in CONTESTED MEGAREGULATION: GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDERING AFTER TPP (Benedict
Kingsbury et al. eds., forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 17) (on file with authors);
Iain Osgood, Sales, Sourcing, or Regulation? New Evidence from the TPP on What
Drives Corporate Interest in Trade Policy, in CONTESTED MEGAREGULATION: GLOBAL
ECONOMIC ORDERING AFTER TPP (Benedict Kingsbury et al. eds., forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript on file with authors) (identifying harmonization as an important concern for corporations in trade policy).
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them.82 This will vary between countries and issue areas, as
organized economic interests that can identify monetary gains
from targeted regulatory change are likely to have a high demand for use of such procedures.
Fourth, regulatory procedures can serve as focal points
around which actors sharing material interests or normative
agendas in specific issue areas can iteratively build up communities of practice.83 Whereas these communities used to be
relatively specific to a domestic regulatory culture, today they
routinely include regulators, firms, and civil society from other
jurisdictions and regulatory domains.84 These communities
can evolve into transnationally operating networks that influence domestic regulatory decision-making not only by amplifying specific interests or building new coalitions but also by
developing their own standards of appropriate action that
frame the understanding of regulatory purpose and agenda.85
The labor-petitions process established pursuant to the 2006
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR), for example, allows organized labor groups to petition the parties’ labor ministries in case they are concerned
about local enforcement of labor laws.86 This procedure facili82
See Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory
Change in Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 1, 4 (Walter Mattli
& Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
83
See KARL DEUTSCH ET AL., POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 46–50 (1957)
(finding that a group holding similar motivations for political behavior is an essential requirement for developing integrated communities); KENNEDY, supra note 5,
at 199–200 (explaining how transnational investors and corporations “play for
rules” to “rig the game”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1764 (1975) (recognizing that public interest
lawyers helped to transform the traditional model of administrative law in their
efforts to improve the administrative process).
84
See David Bach & Abraham Newman, Domestic Drivers of Transgovernmental Regulatory Cooperation, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 395, 397–98 (2014) (providing a brief overview of the scholarship on transgovernmentalism); Lisa Kastner,
‘Much Ado About Nothing?’ Transnational Civil Society, Consumer Protection and
Financial Regulatory Reform, 21 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1313, 1320–22 (2014) (discussing the influence of transnational civil-society networks); see, e.g., Louise
Curran & Jappe Eckhardt, Smoke Screen? The Globalization of Production, Transnational Lobbying and the International Political Economy of Plain Tobacco Packaging, 24 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 87, 97–100 (2017) (discussing transnational firm
lobbying in the context of tobacco regulation).
85
See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Logic of Appropriateness, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 478, 479–82 (Robert E. Goodin et al.
eds., 2011).
86
Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement art. 16.4.3, Aug. 5, 2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text [https://
perma.cc/UJW8-8CLC] [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
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tated development of a new transnational alliance of labor interests to join in concerted action. In 2008, Guatemalan and
U.S. labor groups jointly took advantage of the treaty procedure
to petition the U.S. Department of Labor to bring a case against
Guatemala for violating its obligations to allow for collective
bargaining and ensure acceptable conditions of work.87 The
procedure served as a focal point for coalition building among
NGOs and labor unions.
F. Tilting the Procedural Playing Field in Favor of Certain
Interests
International commitments regarding states’ regulatory
procedures can, similar to McNollgast’s analysis in the domestic context, be used to stack the deck in favor of certain interests. The prioritized private groups are likely to be those which
are particularly influential with state executives, even though
competing interests may also lobby the legislature, leading to
contestation between the two branches and the different coalitions of constituents they represent over the procedures to be
adopted.88 Depending on the specific context, the procedures
ultimately agreed on in treaties can systematically affect the
outcome in conflicts between economic interests and environmental and social interests, between insiders and outsiders, or
combinations of these interests. We identify four ways in
which procedures can stack the deck.
First, the procedural set-up can be specifically designed
with a view to support or hamper a particular substantive interest. In the patent-application process, for example, a procedure to challenge patents before they are granted has been
87
The U.S. ultimately brought and consequently lost a state-to-state case.
For general information, see U.S. TRADE REP., IN THE MATTER OF GUATEMALA – ISSUES
RELATING TO THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 16.2.1(A) OF THE CAFTA-DR, https://
ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements/guatemalasubmission-under-cafta-dr [https://perma.cc/Y29S-A5JU].
88
This is what may have happened in the EU during the TTIP negotiations
where the European Parliament took a more critical stance against Investor-State
Dispute Settlement than the European Commission. Compare European Parliament, Resolution of 8 July 2015 Containing the European Parliament’s Recommendations to the European Commission on the Negotiations for the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (advocating for the replacement of ISDS with a system that gives foreign investors “no greater rights
than domestic investors”), with European Commission Press Release IP/15/5651,
Commission Proposes New Investment Court System for TTIP and Other EU Trade
and Investment Negotiations (Sept. 16, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re
lease_IP-15-5651_en.htm [https://perma.cc/LH5V-LFHQ] (presenting the Commission’s reform proposal for the ISDS). Successful lobbying from influential
groups can, of course, also lead to agreement between the two branches.
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seen as an effective way to prevent the approval of spurious
applications.89 In India, civil society groups advocating for access to medicines have made effective use of this procedure.90
The 2012 economic agreement between South Korea and the
United States prohibited this pre-grant opposition procedure,
thereby favoring patent originators.91
Second, interest groups with more resources can be relatively advantaged by costly procedures. High evidentiary
thresholds, requirements for extensive evidence and sophisticated analyses requiring the consultation of experts or commissioned studies, and multiple opportunities to seek review
can all drive up the cost of participation.92 For example, the
costs associated with investor-state arbitration arising under
international treaties have been credited with establishing an
inherent imbalance between ‘lawyered-up’ investors and respondent states with limited resources.93
Third, procedures can directly advantage certain interests
by privileging some sources and types of information over
others where certain stakeholders exclusively possess this information.94 Conversely, treaty commitments can also prohibit
procedures that would require the release of information that
business firms want to protect. In TPP’s provisions on the reg89
See Ruth Lopert & Deborah Gleeson, The High Price of “Free” Trade: U.S.
Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 199, 203
(2013).
90
See Amy Kapzcynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of
TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1599
(2009).
91
See United States-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement art. 18.8.4,
June 30, 2007, [hereinafter KORUS] (“Where a Party provides proceedings that
permit a third party to oppose the grant of a patent, the Party shall not make such
proceedings available before the grant of the patent.”). In the first leaked version
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s IP chapter, the suggested version of Article 8.7
also prohibited pre-grant opposition. See Knowledge Ecology International, The
Complete Feb. 10, 2011 Text of the US Proposal for the TPP IPR Chapter, art. 8.7,
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3CUY-S7XT]. The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), on the other hand, did not prohibit it. See Australia-United
States Free Trade Agreement art. 17, May 18, 2004, [hereinafter AUSFTA].
92
See McNollgast, Positive Political Theory of Law, supra note 22, at 100; see
also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 8 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 119–24 (1974) (discussing the inequitable
consequences of multiple review stages).
93
See Thomas Schultz & Cédric Dupont, Investment Arbitration: Promoting
the Rule of Law or Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study, 25
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1151–52 (2014) (arguing that the international investment
regime favors the “haves” over the “have-nots”).
94
See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1328–34 (2010) (presenting a theory of information
capture in the U.S. regulatory process).
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ulation of cosmetics, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals, for
example, an identical provision prohibits the parties from requiring “sale data, pricing or related financial data” concerning
the product in relation to their application of marketing
authorization.95
Fourth, provisions may remove obstacles that would otherwise exist in national laws to effective participation of environmental and social interests.96 Relaxed requirements for
standing in administrative procedures and judicial review, burdens of proof in favor of environmental protection, and subsidized representation for resource-constrained civil society
groups can work to support loosely organized interests that
face inherent difficulties in mobilizing.97 The Aarhus Convention, for example, requires states to grant standing for judicial
review to any environmental NGO with respect to the state’s
implementation of its access to information obligations under
the Convention, without having to establish a more specific
interest.98
G. Review as Deck-Stacking or Democratic Corrective
The effectiveness of procedures for regulatory decisionmaking can be bolstered or weakened depending on whether
procedures for review of administrative decisions by courts and
tribunals are available. Without review, opportunities for input
to administrative decision-makers in other countries may have
95
TPP12, supra note 2, at annex 8-E, para. 12; see also id. at annex 8-C, par.
11 (“[N]o Party shall require sale data or related financial information . . . as part of
the [authorization] determination.”); id. at annex 8-D, par. 16 (“No Party shall
require the submission of marketing information, including with respect to prices
or cost, as a condition for the product receiving marketing authorization.”).
96
For legal strategies to regulate group behavior, see generally Eric A. Posner,
The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 144–55 (1996). Particularly relevant are his
discussions of subsidizing groups through group-based rules. See id.
97
See generally Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik,
Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1, 9–16 (2009) (using U.S.
trade policy as an example where multilateral institutions in the form of the WTO
can restrict the influence of special interest factions in national democratic
processes). But in fact, environmental agreements often limit the mandated
“standing” to challenge environmental measures to “interested person[s] residing
or established in its territory.” See, e.g., TPP12, supra note 2, at art. 20.7.2. This
is somewhat analogous to the well-developed debate in the U.S. about the political
significance of strict/liberal standing rules. See generally Bressman, supra note
23, at 1796–804 (discussing the political significance of standing in the context of
administrative law).
98
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters art. 9.2, Jun. 25,
1998, 2161 U.N.T.S 447 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
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much weaker impacts than in the purely domestic setting. Review may be critical in ensuring compliance with both the substantive and procedural obligations in international
agreements and may function either as additional instruments
for deck-stacking in favor of particular interest groups or as
correctives to ensure consideration of the interests of larger
publics or the disregarded.99 Viewing procedures as instruments of control across borders focuses the inquiry on the
exact set-up of review bodies in relation to different issue areas
and types of substantive obligations.100
First, existing domestic review mechanisms may be invoked by private parties seeking review of regulatory action.
Review may be an effective way to enforce substantive and
procedural obligations in treaties regarding the rights of private
actors.101 Whether the domestic legal system, taking into account any relevant treaty provisions, makes such claims justiciable and gives private actors standing to pursue them are
important questions determining the efficacy of these review
mechanisms.102
Second, some treaties create new rights or mechanisms of
domestic review by courts or tribunals that empower private
actors, both transnational and domestic. The parties to an
agreement can determine the character of the review body (judicial or administrative, existing or new, timing (i.e. ex ante or
99
See Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211,
219–20, 230 (2014).
100
See Kingsbury, supra note 34, at 203–28 (discussing the variation).
101
For example, the IP chapter of the North American Free Trade Agreement
provides strong, but relatively standard language:
3. Each Party shall provide that decisions on the merits of a case in
judicial and administrative enforcement proceedings shall:
(a) preferably be in writing and preferably state the reasons on
which the decisions are based;
(b) be made available at least to the parties in a proceeding
without undue delay; and
(c) be based only on evidence in respect of which such parties
were offered the opportunity to be heard.
4. Each Party shall ensure that parties in a proceeding have an
opportunity to have final administrative decisions reviewed by a
judicial authority of that Party and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in its domestic laws concerning the importance of a case,
to have reviewed at least the legal aspects of initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case. Notwithstanding the above, no
Party shall be required to provide for judicial review of acquittals
in criminal cases.
North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1714, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.
102
See generally ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
RULE OF LAW 98–109 (2012) (discussing standing and the right of access as conditions to the international rule of law).
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ex post)), standing, standards of proof, and available remedies.
These can be structured in line with State A’s interests and
that of its constituents.103 For example, national courts may
be required to be open to applications for review in new types of
cases and new types of applicants. They may be required to
provide specified remedies, as for example, in the requirements
of the TRIPS agreement for national courts to be able to issue
preliminary injunctions against patent infringements.104
Benvenisti and Downs have argued that judicial review in national courts can also be a corrective to inequitable interestgroup influence in global governance.105 Treaty commitments
that require national courts to be open to petitions from the
general public may accordingly serve to protect the otherwise
disregarded.106
Third, many treaties establish new review mechanisms beyond the state. These sometimes interlink with domestic review mechanisms or provide an additional layer of review over
states’ regulatory or judicial actions. They can either allow
103

Relatively standard treaty language in U.S. FTAs, for example, reads:
2. Each Party shall ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative proceedings, in accordance with its law, are available to
sanction or remedy violations of its environmental laws.
(a) Such proceedings shall be fair, equitable, and transparent
and, to this end, shall comply with due process of law and be
open to the public, except where the administration of justice
otherwise requires.
5. [T]ribunals that conduct or review [such] proceedings . . . [shall
be] impartial and independent and do not have any substantial
interest in the outcome of the matter.
CAFTA-DR, supra note 86, at art. 17.3. For the importance of analyzing the
specific legal question arising in national courts, see Kenneth Keith, ‘International
Law is Part of the Law of the Land’: True or False?, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 351,
357–60 (2013).
104
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 50,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also Paola Bergallo &
Agustina Ramón Michel, The Recursivity of Global Lawmaking in the Struggle for
an Argentine Policy on Pharmaceutical Patents, in BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH:
THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA
37, 69–71 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & César Rodrı́guez-Garavito eds., 2014) (detailing
the contentious domestic politics of these changes and the ways in which the
exact contours of implementation influence the relative power of different interests in the national courts).
105
See BENVENISTI & DOWNS, supra note 5, at 149–62 (discussing the democratizing potential of national courts); see also Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 249–52 (2008) (explaining the logic of cooperation between
national courts); Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of
International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L.
159, 160–74 (1993) (examining various national courts’ treatment of international
law).
106
We are grateful to Eyal Benvenisti for this suggestion.
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private actors to initiate and independently pursue their grievances (e.g. ISDS or regional human rights courts) or take the
form of traditional state-to-state dispute settlement which requires governments to espouse the claims of private interests.
A deck-stacking feature of the ISDS mechanism, widely found
in bilateral investment as well as trade agreements and in TPP,
is that it is available only to investors and not to representatives of environmental and social interests, that have unsuccessfully sought to participate.107 At first sight, the ISDS
mechanism runs contrary to the McNollgast logic we develop,
because the domestic procedural obligations here are bypassed. But investors can invoke investment treaties’ general
obligations of fair and equitable treatment against a state that
is not keeping its domestic and international procedural obligations.108 This might include even the specific obligations that a
state has made vis-à-vis its domestic regulatory procedures
and mechanisms of administrative and judicial review, thereby
linking domestic administration, administrative law provisions
in international agreements, and international fora for
review.109
H. Four Attractions for Negotiators of Procedural
Commitments in the Two-Level Game
With all this at hand, we identify four characteristics of
procedural commitments that make them particularly attractive to treaty negotiators in Putnam’s two-level game. Following Gourevitch, we emphasize the international sources of
domestic politics—in this case, domestic regulatory decision-

107
But see Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26,
Award, ¶¶ 1110–221 (Dec. 8, 2016) (declaring Argentina’s counterclaim against
the investor admissible in principle but failing on the merits).
108
Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global
Administrative Law 8 (New York University Sch. of Law, Pub. Law and Legal
Theory, Working Paper No. 09-46, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1466980 [https://perma.cc/WP3N-B4YW].
109
One recent example is a Swiss pharmaceutical company’s threatened use
of ISDS under the Colombia-Switzerland bilateral investment treaty in response
to Colombia’s attempts to negotiate cost decreases for a cancer drug. See Compulsory Licensing in Colombia: Leaked Documents Show Aggressive Lobbying by
Novartis, PUBLIC EYE (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.publiceye.ch/en/media/pressrelease/compulsory_licensing_in_colombia_leaked_documents_show_aggressive_
lobbying_by_novartis/ [https://perma.cc/JA87-5PCV].
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making.110 The attractions we identify likely contributed to the
rise in these types of treaty commitments and suggest that this
technology of governance may continue to grow in importance
and variety.
First, in treaty negotiations, transnational procedural obligations may be less contentious than substantive commitments because the diplomatic negotiators may underestimate
their significance. Even where there is no agreement on detailed substantive obligations, regulatory procedures may steer
outcomes in specific directions. Specific substantive policies
may more easily be seen as impositions from abroad maladapted for the domestic context and the regulatory system’s
wider equilibrium.111 Especially for negotiators from less developed countries, who are often spread quite thin, it may often
not be obvious how and in whose favor new procedural obligations would impact the domestic regulatory process, whether
the obligations conflict with other commitments, or how many
resources will be required for implementation.112 To the extent
that procedures are to function as enforcement mechanisms
for substantive obligations, there is a need for at least thin
agreement on the substantive standard at issue. But it may be
much easier to agree on procedures coupled with vague substance than on specific substantive obligations. An example of
significant procedural obligations agreed to by developingcountry negotiators with little appreciation of their implications
is the WTO’s SPS Agreement, where the substantive impact of
the rules to either regulate in accordance with international
standards or to support a regulation with scientific evidence
has since become apparent.113
Second, in the political dynamics at the domestic or the
international tables, administrative procedures may often be
less salient in domestic politics, making it easier to obtain
agreement. In cases of sharp substantive disagreement, procedures may offer a compromise. As Putnam noted, the composition of the interested stakeholders in the domestic-level game
110
See Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International
Sources of Domestic Politics, 32 INT’L ORG. 881, 882–900 (1978) (explaining the
impact of the international system on domestic politics).
111
See Stewart, Global Standards, supra note 74, at 183–84.
112
See Kevin Davis & Benedict Kingsbury, Obligation Overload 9–10 (Apr. 17,
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
113
See Tim Büthe, The Globalization of Health and Safety Standards: Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the SPS Agreement of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 225 (2008)
(explaining the implications of the requirement to regulate in accordance with
international standards or to support a regulation with scientific evidence).
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will vary across issues, with politicized or politically salient
issues drawing more interested participants, thereby making
agreement more difficult, especially as the new participants are
often less concerned about a scenario in which no agreement
takes place at all.114 For example, TPP negotiators were entangled in sharp disputes over the substantive issue of the exact
number of years of exclusive data usage granted to the owners
of biologics—an issue which had mobilized significant opposition in the domestic discourses of New Zealand, Australia,
Chile, Canada, and others.115 It was therefore to be expected
that, with the United States dropping out, the CPTPP would
suspend this provision.116 In reaction to such sharp substantive disagreements, an astute interest group may be able to
increase its share of the negotiated pie by receding from demands for a longer protection period in favor of less salient but
similarly valuable procedural objectives such as precluding
pre-grant opposition to patents, which nevertheless create significant gains for them in the long-term. On occasion, however,
procedural provisions may be salient and highly controversial,
especially when they are seen to be closely aligned with substantive outcomes, as exemplified in the furor in Europe over
the ISDS provisions in the draft TTIP treaty.117
Third, a significant feature of the two-level game is its potential for coalitions between different interest groups in different countries who each think they would benefit from
procedural provisions.118 Coalitions may be built around procedures as opposed to substantive commitments. A commitment to the principle of access to information, for example, may
generate coalitions between outsider economic interests and
local and transnational environmental/social interests.119
114

Putnam, Two-Level Games, supra note 7, at 444.
The final outcome was an odd compromise provision that required either
eight years of data exclusivity or five years plus other measures and market
circumstances that would together “deliver a comparable outcome in the market.”
TPP12, supra note 2, at art. 18.51.
116
See CPTPP, supra note 9.
117
See Alexsia T. Chan & Beverly K. Crawford, The Puzzle of Public Opposition
to TTIP in Germany, 19 BUS. & POL. 683, 695–98 (2017) (explaining the controversy surrounding the ISDS provisions).
118
See Putnam, Two-Level Games, supra note 7, at 444 (“[T]ransnational
alignments may emerge, tacit or explicit, in which domestic interests pressure
their respective governments to adopt mutually supportive policies.”).
119
Cf. Osgood, supra note 81, manuscript at 12 (discussing various coalitions
that formed regarding the TPP); see also Ala’i & D’Orsi, supra note 1, at 367–68
(noting the “dual use” potential of transparency for both trade liberalization by
empowering economic actors and its potential role in government accountability,
civil society participation, and addressing due process concerns).
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From the perspective of economic actors, transparency obligations can help to flush out cronyism between rivals and government officials and enable them to obtain information about the
agency’s position in order to more effectively influence its decisions,120 whereas environmental and social interests may also
favor informational provisions which they can use not only to
influence regulatory decisions but also to mobilize wider public
support.121 Take, as an example, the case of Claude-Reyes v.
Chile before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. There,
the court held in favor of the plaintiff, a reform-minded lawyer
affiliated with NGOs, who claimed that Chile had violated his
right of access to public information when the Chilean Foreign
Investment Committee refused his request for information
about the foreign investors seeking a government concession
for a vast forestry project in the Tierra del Fuego archipelago.122 Here, there could well be overlapping interests between
domestic forestry developers resisting foreign competition and
environmental groups seeking to stop the project altogether.
We expect other norms of good government, such as reasongiving or review to create similar potentials for coalition building—albeit with significant variation between contexts.
Because generic procedural commitments such as transparency in regulatory decision-making often do not make explicit the substantive ends to which they will be used, they
allow for heterogeneous set of interests with disparate, if not
contradictory, substantive agendas to build coalitions pushing
for provisions on access to information.123 Obligations in treaties justified as realizations of the principle of transparency, for
example, may receive wide support across the spectrum of interest groups which—sometimes too uncritically—generally
favor more government disclosure. But the procedural provisions in the treaty may often end up being specific rather than
generic and exhibit significant variation in terms of intensity,
specificity, scope, and standing between different issue areas.
120
The information, where it relates to activities and business competitors,
has commercial value. Most U.S. FOIA requests are by businesses. Cory Schouten, Who Files the Most FOIA Requests? It’s Not Who You Think, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/foia-report-media-journalists-business-mapper.php [https://perma.cc/HTR6-UCYC].
121
This idea is the bedrock of the Aarhus Convention. See Aarhus Convention, supra note 98.
122
Claude-Reyes v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 12.108, ¶¶ 9–11, 53–60 (Sept. 19, 2006).
123
See, e.g., Michael Mason, Transparency for Whom? Information Disclosure
and Power in Global Environmental Governance, 8 GLOBAL. ENVTL. POL. 8, 11 (2008)
(discussing such coalitions in the area of environmental governance).
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These varying procedures may favor specific substantive outcomes and interests, although only some of them may be sufficiently strong and targeted to function as instruments of
transnational control.
Fourth, treaty commitments for domestic administrative
procedures may be particularly attractive to the representatives of states with developed regulatory law and institutions
and strong and transnationally active interest groups. Because commitments in international economic agreements are
usually reciprocal—what applies to one party applies to all
other parties equally—substantive constraints will equally apply to a powerful state.124 Procedural requirements in treaties
that are based, as is often the case, on practices in jurisdictions
such as the United States and European Union may create de
facto nonreciprocal commitments.125 The powerful jurisdictions will have already adopted these procedures and their constituencies have become experienced in using them to their
advantage.126 Other jurisdictions will have to adopt and learn
the new procedures. This situation represents an application
of Büthe & Mattli’s notion of institutional complementarity:
where international institutions are derived from and congruent with those of one or a few domestic jurisdictions, that circumstance will enhance the power and influence of those
jurisdictions and their private actors that have become adept at
working the institutional machinery which is being
internationalized.127
I. Limits to the Effectiveness of Procedural Requirements
as Instruments of Transnational Control
Our exposition would be incomplete without noting the
often-significant limitations of treaty-based procedural com124
There are many examples of treaty obligations regarding trade and regulation that are not reciprocal—bound tariff rates perhaps being the most obvious.
125
Cf. Stewart, Global Standards, supra note 74, at 191 (“[P]rocedures will do
little by themselves to overcome power differentials . . . without local NGOs and
supportive government agencies that have the resources, expertise, ability to
mobilize social and political support to take advantage of these procedures.”).
126
In the case of TPP, for example, the U.S. would have had to change no laws
and almost no regulations to be in compliance. See The Trans-Pacific Partnership
Implementation Act: [Draft] Statement of Administrative Action, https://ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/DRAFT-Statement-of-Administrative-Action.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2P3Q-KHPX].
127
See generally TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 42–59 (2011) (developing the
idea of institutional complementarity to explain national regulators’ influence in
global rulemaking).
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mitments as instruments of transnational control. The effectiveness of procedural mechanisms established by treaty
crucially depends on their implementation. Without good faith
legislative and regulatory changes to give the treaty provisions
effect, the procedural machinery set out in the treaty may
amount to little. Developing countries may, for example, have
an overwhelming number of obligations to comply with and
may not be concerned with such procedures.128 Implementation will also depend on the available support from political
principals. This may in part depend on whether the government sees a benefit from the procedures for its own agenda. In
the case of TPP and Japan, for example, the external pressure
created by the treaty comports with Prime Minister Abe’s own
reform agenda.129 In other cases, political officials may see the
procedures as inimical to their ability to maintain control and
to target benefits to their favored constituencies. In these
cases, it will depend on the interests and abilities of State A to
exert pressure on State B to remedy deficiencies in
implementation.
Where government leaders in State B oppose the treaty
goals and mechanisms, control through procedures may not be
able to withstand conflicts with more direct control strategies
deployed by those leaders, such as direct oversight, budgetary
adjustments, and hiring and firing. In contrast to McNollgast’s
initial analytical setting, the transnationally operative procedures operate in a space where direct control of regulatory
decision-making lies with a different political principal (State
B). In cases where ingrained organized interests are close to
the regulators or the political principals in State B, new procedures may do little to change outcomes.
Further, host states vary in sophistication and capacity.130
In cases of low capacity and resources, the establishment of
new regulatory procedures may simply miss the inevitable reality of ad hoc administrative action. The treaty commitments
may sometimes presuppose a structure of an administrative
state that in fact does not exist. The lack of effective domestic
mechanisms of review may also hinder the potential of treatybased procedures as instruments of control. Training and “ca128

See Davis & Kingsbury, supra note 112, at 9–10.
See Davis, supra note 54, at 13–18.
130
See generally Benedict Kingsbury & Megan Donaldson, The Roles of Law in
the Regulatory States of the South, in THE RISE OF THE REGULATORY STATE OF THE
SOUTH: INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 256, 257–64
(Navroz K. Dubash & Bronwen Morgan eds., 2013) (examining variation in specific
factors across several regulatory states).
129
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pacity building” efforts may be crucial for implementation.131 A
further factor is the receptivity to new requirements on the part
of the regulatory administration and courts. To the extent the
new procedures deviate significantly from established routines
and regulatory and administrative cultures, there may be significant contestation and resistance.
Finally, the effectiveness of the procedures supplied depends on the existence of demanders able and willing to use
them.132 The nature of the demand for procedures will depend
on the ecosystem of interest groups for which these mechanisms may be attractive avenues for exerting influence. In
some cases, sophisticated networks of organized business interests may generate active and engaged use of procedures.133
In other cases, especially where potential users are representatives of environmental and social interests plagued by difficulties in organizing and funding, demand may be low, and some
potential users may not even know about available procedural
avenues for influencing decisions.134 Transnational networks
of environmental, labor, human rights NGOs are, however, developing an increasingly sophisticated understanding of available procedures and have, in some cases, used them
effectively.135
II
EXPLAINING THE RISE OF PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS
The proliferation of procedural requirements for domestic
administration negotiated for in treaties over the past several
131
See, e.g., Tran Thi Kieu Trang & Richard A. Bales, On the Precipice: Prospects for Free Labor Unions in Vietnam, 19 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 71, 84–85 (2017)
(discussing capacity building as it relates to labor reform in Vietnam).
132
Mattli & Woods, supra note 82, at 4.
133
For example, businesses can use the enquiry points mandated pursuant to
Article 10 of the TBT Agreement. See TBT Agreement, supra note 53, at art. 10.
134
Based on our research, the national enquiry points established under the
TBT Agreement, for example, are rarely used by transnational civil society actors.
See TBT Agreement, supra note 53, at art. 10.
135
Examples of internationally active environmental NGOs using procedures
are the Environmental Investigation Agency and the Center for International Environmental Law. About EIA, ENV’T INVESTIGATION AGENCY, https://eia-global.org/
about [https://perma.cc/9MYF-H58Z]; Our Strategy, CTR. FOR INT’L ENV’T L.,
http://www.ciel.org/about-us/strategy [https://perma.cc/Z9G6-4JWT]. But see
César Rodrı́guez-Garavito, Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples,
and the Right to Prior Consultation in Social Minefields, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 263, 282–90 (2011) (documenting the role of partially internationally mandated procedures for consultation and consent and their ambiguous effects on
indigenous peoples’ rights).
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decades reflects the logic of the McNollgast framework and the
political economy of Putnam’s two-level game. Yet this logic is
not new. It may be the turn in international law toward the
regulation of private conduct of firms and individuals and the
governance demands of an ever-deeper integrated world economy that help to explain the emergence of these types of commitments as a significant legal technology of global regulatory
governance.136 This Part of the Article outlines the proliferation with reference to our theoretical framework.
Our sketch starts with the 1947 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), spans the 1995 Uruguay Round
agreements, and continues in the 2000s with the bilateral
trade agreement practices of the United States and European
Union.137 The evolution of procedural commitments in these
treaties is the result of executive-branch officials seeking to
satisfy the demands of powerful economic constituencies for
stronger disciplines on states’ regulatory practices. Starting
with the side-agreements for the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), there has also been political pressure to
include environmental, labor, and other concerns of social protection into economic treaties, and here too procedural commitments have found application, although they are often
weak.
A. GATT Article X
The foundational regulatory process innovation of the postwar economic order is Article X of the 1947 GATT.138 Article X
136
See generally ANNE PETERS, BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 495–530 (Jonathan Huston trans., 2016) (discussing the effects and implication of the increasingly individualized nature of international law).
137
For purposes of clear exposition, we focus our genealogy on treaties, but
suspect that more informal inter-state agreements also fit our framework. Examples are the procedures governing the Financial Action Task Force or those of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Financial Action Task Force. Procedures for the FATF Fourth Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations, FIN. ACTION TASK
FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF-4thRound-Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/EGQ3-FQ45] (last updated June
2018); Basel Committee Charter, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, https:/
/www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm [https://perma.cc/Z5GD-9SLL] (last updated
June 5, 2018); see also James Thuo Gathii, The Financial Action Task Force and
Global Administrative Law, 2010 J. Prof. Law. 197, 200–04 (discussing FATF
reforms as global administrative law); Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global
Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 21–23 (2006)
(discussing the merits of the Basel process).
138
Article X of the Agreement required parties to publish “[l]aws, regulations,
judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application” which affected the movement of goods or capital “in such a manner as to enable govern-
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grew out of the United States’ desire to create better opportunities for its businesses in the newly constituting system of global
commerce, at a time when the reforms of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act had created a new model of regulatory governance based on public access information, participation, and
reason giving.139 Negotiators of other countries dismissed the
need for such procedures in the GATT on the ground that experienced traders knew very well what regulations apply to the
products that they traded. John Jackson succinctly explained
why this answer was not satisfactory, and why Article X was
needed:
It is an answer which may please those traders that are already engaging in trade in a particular product, since the
information which they have has a commercial value to them.
But the lack of information inhibits the entry into that market by new traders and limited entry thus decreases the
amount of competition for that market. Thus the lack of
information is a nontariff trade barrier resulting in joint benefits to the importing nation’s government and the established traders.140

This account clearly exhibits the logic of procedural commitments as instruments of control at a distance to benefit
economic actors from other states. These export interests had
a major role in negotiating the agreement.141 Despite its longterm transformative potential, Article X was not particularly
controversial among the negotiators and regarded as “a procedural provision lacking in substantive force.”142 This history
ments and traders to become acquainted with them.” General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade art. X.1, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-5
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948) (emphasis added).
The genealogy of generic commitments to notify, publish, and provide for participation of private actors in domestic decision-making has been traced even further
back to the 1923 International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities which required publication “in such a manner as to enable
persons concerned to become acquainted with [customs formalities] and to avoid
the prejudice which might result from the application of customs formalities of
which they are ignorant.” International Convention Relating to the Simplification
of Customs Formalities art. 4, Nov. 3, 1923, 14 League of Nations O.J. 1032
[hereinafter Customs Convention]; see also Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and
Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 927, 929 (2004);
Gao, supra note 55, at 329. The United States was not a party to this Convention.
139
Ala’i & D’Orsi, supra note 1, at 370.
140
JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 462 (1969).
141
See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US TRADE
POLICY 494–500 (2017) (detailing the empowerment of export interests in the U.S.
trade policy process in the post-War era compared to earlier periods).
142
Ala’i & D’Orsi, supra note 1, at 370; see also Sylvia Ostry, China and the
WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 3–5 (1998)
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comports with our hypothesis that it may be easier to successfully negotiate for procedural as opposed to substantive obligations. Article X came to life as it started to be invoked in
conflicts over trade policy. Beginning in the 1980s, the United
States began to invoke Article X’s transparency commitment
against Japan.143 U.S. firms’ inability to penetrate the Japanese market, despite lower tariffs, spurred a focus on Japan’s
regulatory processes.144 Of particular interest was the government’s practice to issue “administrative guidance” which was
selectively shared with mostly domestic firms and effectively
excluded U.S. businesses.145
B. The WTO Agreements
The procedural machinery was greatly expanded and substantively transformed with the Uruguay Round agreements
and the creation of the World Trade Organization, which included a powerful new dispute-settlement system with a standing Appellate Body. With the package of WTO Agreements in
1995—and on the apparent suggestion of an expert group
chaired by Swiss banker Fritz Leutwiler—a new principle of
participation rights for private actors in domestic regulatory
administration gained ground in international economic
law.146 Today, some even consider the WTO’s “transparency
and accountability mechanisms” to be its most important aspect—more so than negotiation rounds or even its famous
dispute-settlement system.147
In 1997, the Appellate Body found that Article X:2 of the
GATT embodied a principle of “fundamental importance—that
of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting
Members and private persons and enterprises, whether of do(explaining that Article X received little attention during the often contentious
negotiations).
143
Ala’i & D’Orsi, supra note 1, at 370.
144
IRWIN, supra note 141, at 603.
145
Id. at 602–04 (presenting the contentious debate in the first Reagan administration about policy response to Japan’s regulatory barriers for market access
by U.S. firms and products). In the second Reagan administration, U.S. policy
switched to a focus on exchange rates that resulted in the 1985 “Plaza Accord”
where Japanese and European officials agreed to seek increases in their currencies relative to the dollar. Id. at 605.
146
Charnovitz, supra note 138, at 936–37. Cf. GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A
BETTER FUTURE: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 46–47 (1985) (advocating expanding the
right to file complaints beyond the parties to the agreement).
147
Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert Wolfe, From Sunshine to a Common Agent:
The Evolving Understanding of Transparency in the WTO, 21 BROWN J. WORLD AFF.
117, 118 (2015). For a more detailed discussion, see Stewart & Badin, supra note
33, at 569–74.
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mestic or foreign nationality.”148 It stated that transparency
included the instrumental purpose to allow not only the WTO
member states but individual traders and firms the opportunity to “protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to
seek modification of such measures.”149 The Appellate Body’s
linkage of access to information and the ability to engage the
regulatory process, displays the logic of procedural entitlements as instruments of transnational control.150
The other WTO Agreements create a considerable variety of
private procedural rights in domestic decision-making.151
Some are generic in that they apply across a broad range of
issues and do not specify or limit who can invoke them, but in
practice are used primarily by business firms. An example is
the TBT Agreement’s requirement for local enquiry points
about regulation and regulatory proposals which are accessible
to all interested persons.152 This spawned a wide-ranging creation of locally nested points of access for private firms. Others
are targeted and reflect deck-stacking. Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement, for example, entitles patent holders to specific
rights of notice and participation in governmental decisions to
override patents for public purposes.153 Specifically targeted is
also Article 3 of the Agreement on Safeguards which prescribes
how members’ regulatory authorities are to conduct their domestic investigations to determine whether safeguards are ade148
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Restrictions on Imports of
Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, 21, WTO Doc. WT/DS24/AB/R (adopted
Feb. 25, 1997).
149
Id. (emphasis added).
150
Charnovitz, supra note 138, at 935.
151
See id. at 936–38 (providing an overview of private procedural rights ranging from the Antidumping Agreement to the TBT Agreement).
152
TBT Agreement, supra note 53, art. 10.1 (“Each Member shall ensure that
an enquiry point exists which is able to answer all reasonable enquiries from
other Members and interested parties in other Members as well as to provide the
relevant documents regarding: 10.1.1 any technical regulations adopted or proposed within its territory . . . .”) (emphasis added).
153
See TRIPS, supra note 104, at art. 31. The agreement for China’s accession
to the WTO goes further than the WTO agreements—for example, in its commitment to provide a mandatory public comment period. See Gao, supra note 55, at
336 (discussing the Accession Protocol’s requirement to impose a comment period); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference Decision of November 23,
2001, WTO Doc. WT/L/432 ¶ 2 (2001) (“China shall establish or designate an
official journal dedicated to the publication of all laws, regulations and other
measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control
of foreign exchange and . . . shall provide a reasonable period for comment to the
appropriate authorities before such measures are implemented, except for those
laws, regulations and other measures involving national security, specific measures setting foreign exchange rates or monetary policy and other measures the
publication of which would impede law enforcement.”).
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quate.154 But it exemplifies the possibilities for procedural
deck-stacking as a means to include more diffuse interests into
the calculus of regulatory decision-making. “[A]ll interested
parties,” explicitly including importers and exporters (presumably to be able to counteract the concerns voiced by the domestic industry seeking protection from foreign competition) are to
have the opportunity to:
present evidence and their views, including the opportunity
to respond to the presentations of other parties and to submit
their views, inter alia, as to whether or not the application of
a safeguard measure would be in the public interest.155

The regulatory authorities are consequently required to
publish a reasoned decision “on all pertinent issues of fact and
law.”156 This provision’s procedural machinery empowers
traders vis-à-vis the domestic industry asking for the safeguard
in two ways. It makes the “public interest” the relevant unit of
analysis and thereby draws attention to the diffuse, but in
aggregate, significant cost to consumers through higher prices
which can result from safeguards. It also requires publication
of all parts of the factual and legal analysis which improves
traders’ ability to identify flaws in the reasoning, makes it
harder to fudge the analysis to reach a predetermined result,
and provides some of the information needed to seek judicial
review.
C. U.S. and EU Treaty Practice: WTO “Plus” Procedures
The Uruguay Round left developing economies with a
strong sense of having been pushed into an unfair deal and
resulted in subsequent negotiations marked by deadlock.157
Particular suspicion plagued the regulatory issues in the Doha
negotiating agenda, at a time when further tariff liberalization
made these particularly important.158 Multinational firms
pushed for further disciplines on state regulation that impeded
trade in goods and services. During the late 1990s and 2000s,
the United States and the European Union developed tem154
Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, in
THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 276, art. 3 (1999).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
See Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219,
221–25 (2004) (chronicling the various rounds of trade negotiations that followed
the Uruguay round).
158
Id. at 230–31 (calling the Singapore issues a “conference-buster”).
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plates for a range of regulation-targeted generic and specific
procedural provisions which they included in a series of bilateral trade agreements.159
The 2004 U.S.-Chile FTA includes a representative example of a widely used WTO “Plus” provision.160 It requires the
parties to allow “persons of the other Party to participate in the
development of . . . technical regulations . . . on terms no less
favorable than those accorded to its own persons” and mandates a process for public comments on planned regulatory
action resembling the notice-and-comment rulemaking process established in the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act.161
When in 2014, Chile proposed to introduce mandatory STOPsign styled front-of-package labels on food and drinks high in
calories, sugar, fat, or salt, transnational economic interests—
filtering their demands through industry organizations—made
effective use of these procedural entitlements.162 The U.S.based Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA), representing
the U.S. food and beverage industry, FoodDrink Europe, the
Brazilian-Chilean Chamber of Commerce, and other economic
interests submitted extensive comments; domestic NGOs but
no foreign environmental/social groups did the same.163 GMA
asserted that the proposed regulation violated the requirement

159
160

We suspect a similar story could be told for the EU.
See, e.g., CETA, supra note 76, at art. 4.6; TPP12, supra note 2, at art.

26.2.
161
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 7.6.1, further
specified in art. 7.7.2-7, June 6, 2003, https://photos.state.gov/libraries/oman/
328671/fta/technical-barriers.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HME-H4EQ]; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
162
See Lorena Rodriguez, Presentation at the World Trade Organization: The
Implementation of New Regulation on Nutritional Labelling in Chile, https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/8_Chile_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2Q23DBD]. See generally COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 72, THE EMERGING GLOBAL HEALTH CRISIS: NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASES IN
LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 9–18 (2014).
163
See Grocery Manufacturers Association, Comments on the Proposal from
Chile, Notified to the World Trade Organization as CHL/282 on 22 August 2014
(Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.chilecrecesano.com/medios/2014/Octubre/
GMA.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8TG-G9WY]; FoodDrink Europe, FoodDrinkEurope’s comments on WTO notification G/TBT/N/CHL/282 - Proposed
Amendment to the Chilean Food Health Regulations, Supreme Decree No. 977/96
(Sep. 26, 2014), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/
tradoc_153860.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC5M-VXDF]; Cámara Chileno Brasileña
de Comercio, Consulta pública propuesta sobre modificación del Reglamento
Sanitario de los Alimentos (RSA) para la implementación de la ley 20.606 (Oct. 18,
2014).
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in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement for regulations not to be
“more trade restrictive than necessary.”164
While we cannot establish causality, after receiving these
comments, and after other WTO members—including most
prominently the European Union and United States—raised
“concerns” at the WTO’s TBT Committee, Chile still pushed
ahead with what became the world’s strictest front-of-package
label but revised its regulation by changing the phrasing on the
labels from “exceso de” (in excess of certain limits) to “alto en”
(high in).165 This example shows how inter-state procedural
obligations create a pathway for foreign economic actors to
potentially influence regulatory decision-making in another
state. They can further use this machinery to help enforce
(their interpretation of) substantive international commitments, as the GMA did for the TBT Agreement.
A further example of WTO “Plus” treaty practice comes in
the 2016 EU-Vietnam FTA. In its chapter on transparency is
the requirement to “provide for mechanisms available for interested persons seeking a solution to problems that have arisen
from the application of measures of general application under
this Agreement.”166 This effectively amounts to a bolstering of
the local enquiry points already required by the TBT Agreement. It creates a general right for private actors to complain to
the government about asserted problems resulting from alleged
faulty implementation or noncompliance with the agreement.
Effective use of these mechanisms not only opens an additional
interface for private actors to lobby the government but may
produce significant information to be used in eventual actions
for review (i.e., through ISDS mechanisms).
Another example involving issue-specific procedures in
FTAs concerns government drug-reimbursement schedules
164
See Grocery Manufacturers Association, supra note 163. But see Robert
Howse, The World Health Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 9, 54–56 (2016) (describing the “more trade restrictive
than necessary” determination).
165
Rodriguez, supra note 162. Chile’s labeling requirement has been gaining
international recognition which explains the interest of large transnational businesses in influencing its exact regulatory contours. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, In
Sweeping War on Obesity, Chile Slays Tony the Tiger, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/health/obesity-chile-sugar-regulations.
html [https://perma.cc/6589-2A49].
166
EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, EU-Viet., Ch. 18, art. 4.4, (as finally
negotiated on Feb. 1, 2016) [hereinafter EU-Vietnam FTA]. There is also non-EU
or U.S. WTO Plus treaty practice. See, e.g., the ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand FTA Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade
Area, ASEAN-Austl. and N.Z., Ch. 8, art. 11, Annex on Financial Services, art. 5.4,
Feb. 27, 2009.
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which specify the drugs that will be covered by public health
insurance and the reimbursement amount. These schedules
are an arena of conflict between originator or proprietary pharmaceutical companies (in contrast to generics) and advocates
for wider and cheaper access to medicines.167 Unless drugs
offer an additional clinical benefit over a comparable existing
drug, they cannot receive a higher price.168 Originator drug
companies consider these reimbursement schedules a “fourth
hurdle” to the sale of their products in addition to demonstrating a drug’s safety, efficacy, and quality.169 For advocates of
public health care models, they are a legitimate use of concentrated buying power to reduce drug prices.
Both U.S.- and EU-led bilateral treaties have included
strong, precise, and strikingly similar procedural obligations
for states’ decision-making about including drugs on these reimbursement schedules.170 A notable example is chapter 5 of
KORUS, which combines substantive obligations to set the reimbursement price fairly, non-discriminatorily, and “based on
competitive market-derived prices,”171 with procedural requirements to allow the “manufacturer of the pharmaceutical product” to apply for an increased reimbursement amount,172 have
the regulator make their determinations of reimbursement
within a reasonable time,173 disclose to applicants “all procedural rules, methodologies, principles, criteria . . . and guidelines used to determine pricing and reimbursement,”174
provide applicants the opportunity to comment and guarantee
167
See Ruth Lopert & Sara Rosenbaum, What is Fair? Choice, Fairness, and
Transparency in Access to Prescription Medicines in the United States and Australia, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 643, 644 (2007). Additionally, Abbott argues that,
“More recently, the PT&IA template advanced by the United States initiates a
deeper intrusion into the public health regulatory arena. The new template provides for intervention by pharmaceutical originator companies into government
decision-making regarding whether to include particular drugs in national health
formularies, and into decisions regarding pricing.” Frederick M. Abbott, The
Evolution of Public Health Provisions in Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements of the United States, in CURRENT ALLIANCES IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAWMAKING: THE EMERGENCE AND IMPACT OF MEGA-REGIONALS 45, 47 (Pedro
Roffe & Xavier Seuba eds., 2017).
168
Lopert & Rosenbaum, supra note 167, at 645.
169
Id.
170
See Andreas Dür & Dirk de Bièvre, Inclusion without Influence? NGOs in
European Trade Policy, 27 J. PUB. POL’Y 79, 93–97 (2007) (documenting the influence of the pharmaceutical industry in the EU’s policy debates around access to
medicines).
171
KORUS, supra note 91, at art. 5.2(b).
172
Id. at art. 5.3.2(b)(2).
173
Id. at art. 5.3.5(b).
174
Id.
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them “meaningful, detailed written information” regarding the
pricing and reimbursement decision,175 and provide them with
the “membership list of all committees related to pricing or
reimbursement . . . .”176 KORUS further requires the establishment of an independent review body which can be invoked by
“an applicant directly affected,”177 excluding groups advocating
for affordable access to medicines and other social interests.178
This elaborate procedural machinery clearly stacks the deck in
favor of the originator pharmaceutical industry with the purpose to lower the “fourth hurdle.”179
The “fast-track” legislation for KORUS even asked for “the
elimination of government measures such as price controls and
reference pricing which deny full-market access for United
States products.”180 USTR negotiators reportedly demanded
that the “fourth hurdle” be eliminated, but the Korean negotiators refused.181 KORUS illustrates how, as we discussed
above, procedural commitments—in this instance giving originator pharmaceutical companies rights to influence the listing
process—can present a possible pathway to agreement, where
175

Id. at art. 5.3.5(d).
Id. at art. 5.3.5(g).
177
Id. at art. 5.3.5(e). KORUS additionally established a “Medicines and Medical Device Committee” which is to meet at least once a year and is co-chaired by
health and trade officials. Id. at art. 5.7.
178
A side letter between the U.S. and South Korea further concretizes the
structure of the review body: it is to be independent of the health care authorities,
is not to be staffed by the authorities’ employees, and its staff is to be appointed
for a fixed period and not be subject to removal by the authorities. KORUS,
Pharmaceuticals Products and Medical Devices Confirmation Letter (Independent
Review Process), ¶ 2, https://www.uskoreaconnect.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/5.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4UE-HGLA] .
179
We have no direct evidence of the KORUS process leading to different
outcomes, but the internal appeal mechanism of Korea changed the outcomes in
13% of appeals. Sung Eun Park et al., Evaluation on the First 2 Years of the
Positive List System in South Korea, 104 HEALTH POL’Y 32, 34 (2012). As of October
2015, the KORUS’ own review body had not been active. Eun-Young Bae et al.,
Eight-year Experience Using HTA in Drug Reimbursement: South Korea, 120
HEALTH POL’Y 612, 613 (2016). With our methods, however, it is not possible to
find out whether the shadow of its existence has a disciplining effect on the
Korean health authorities’ internal process. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950, 968–70 (1979) (explaining how the outcome the law will impose if a case goes
to trial shapes a party’s bargaining position). As Frederick Abbott notes, the
detailed decision-making procedures’ right for independent review create prospects of “facing time-consuming litigation involving pharmaceutical industry lawyers [which] will pressure public health authorities to lean towards approval so as
to avoid it.” Abbott, supra note 167, at 54.
180
Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(8)(D) (2012).
181
Lopert & Gleeson, supra note 89, at 205.
176
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disagreements over substance otherwise stand in the way.182
Nonetheless the leading U.S. pharmaceuticals industry group,
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), and the USTR itself have signaled their dissatisfaction with Korea’s implementation of its transparency, reasongiving, and review commitments for the reimbursement process.183 As mentioned in our discussion of this strategy’s limits, the balance of control often ultimately lies with the
implementing authorities.184
Another dimension of the treaty dynamic is that procedural
provisions agreed to in one bilateral FTA are often followed,
with variations, in subsequent treaties, creating a network of

182

See supra subpart I.H.
THE PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA (PHRMA),
COMMENTS TO 2017 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS
(NTE) 120 (2016), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/files/dmfile/PhRMA-2017NTE-Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVH3-5BL6] (“Under Article 5.3(5)(e) of
the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement and the side letter thereto, Korea agreed to
‘make available an independent review process that may be invoked at the request
of an applicant directly affected by a [pricing/reimbursement] recommendation or
determination.’ The Korean Government has taken the position, however, that
reimbursed prices negotiated with pharmaceutical companies should not be subject to the IRM because the National Health Insurance Service (NHIS) does not
make ‘determinations’ and merely negotiates the final price at which a company
will be reimbursed. However, this interpretation totally negates the original purpose of the IRM, which we believe should apply to the negotiation process for
prices of all reimbursed drugs, particularly patented medicines.”); UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE 2016 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 284 (2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-NTE-Re
port-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F6H-KQAW] (“The U.S. medical devices sector continues to cite concerns regarding transparency and the availability of opportunities for meaningful engagement regarding such regulation, including with
respect to the October 2013 medical device reimbursement plan based on import
pricing or manufacturing cost. The United States has expressed its concern that
the reimbursement pricing of medical devices should be determined in a fair,
nondiscriminatory, and transparent manner and urged MOHW to engage directly
with stakeholders to address their concerns. The United States will continue to
monitor these issues closely.”).
184
See supra subpart I.I. The KORUS pharmaceuticals example also illustrates the potential alignment of insider and outsider interests. The PhRMA is the
major industry association of the originator pharmaceutical industry. In South
Korea, PhRMA’s “local sister association” is the Korean Research-based Pharma
Industry Association (KRPIA), which in its membership has a significant overlap
with the multinational businesses also represented in PhRMA, is likely to benefit
from the new procedures. Out of KRPIA’s 38 member companies, 17 were also
listed members of PhRMA. Compare Member Companies, KOREAN RESEARCH-BASED
PHARMA INDUSTRY ASS’N,
http://members.krpia.or.kr/company/member.asp
[https://perma.cc/MN7G-TNH9], withPhRMA Welcomes Five New Member Companies, PHARMACEUTICAL RES. & MANUFACTURERS OF AM. (July 15, 2016), http://
www.phrma.org/press-release/phrma-welcomes-five-new-member-companies
[https://perma.cc/6TZB-FHJU].
183
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obligations when multilateral mechanisms are blocked.185
Thus, the procedural provisions in KORUS built on similar, but
overall less demanding procedures in the 2005 United StatesAustralia Free Trade Agreement.186 For well-organized repeat
players such as the multinational pharmaceutical companies,
the negotiation for procedural commitments in one agreement
can be part of longer-term strategy across a range of agreements. The pervasive influence of the pharmaceutical industry
is reflected in the circumstance that in bilateral FTAs negotiated by the European Union feature almost identical procedural obligations.187 Pharmaceutical provisions very like those in
the U.S.-Australia Agreement were subsequently adopted in
TPP12,188 regionalizing these and other procedural versions in
FTAs. The TPP12 procedures were suspended in CPTPP as New
Zealand complained vociferously about adverse budgetary implications for its healthcare system,189 showing the limits to
procedural commitments’ ability to escape public attention.190
D. Procedures for Environmental and Social Protection
To develop our theory and show its applications, we have
thus far focused on procedural commitments for the primary or
even exclusive use by economic actors. The WTO Agreements,
which feature no affirmative agenda for environmental or social
protection, have been used primarily by business interests.191
185
See, e.g., Jean Frédéric Morin et al., The Trade Regime as a Complex
Adaptive System: Exploration and Exploitation of Environmental Norms in Trade
Agreements, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 365, 383–89 (2017) (examining this phenomenon
in the context of environmental norms in trade agreements).
186
See Lopert & Rosenbaum, supra note 167, at 650; Lopert & Gleeson, supra
note 89, at 204.
187
See, e.g., EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 166, at Annex 2-A (“Pharmaceutical
Products and Medical Devices”) (mirroring the obligations in TPP Art. 26-A); EUSingapore Agreement, EU-Singapore, Annex 2-C (“Pharmaceutical Products and
Medical Devices”) (2015) (mirroring); EU-Korea Agreement, EU-Korea, Annex 2-D
(“Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices”) (2010) (mirroring).
188
See TPP12, supra note 2, at Annex 26-A (Transparency and Procedural
Fairness for Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices). This annex was
suspended in TPP11. CPTPP, supra note 9, ¶ 20, Annex II—List of Suspended
Provisions.
189
See Deborah Gleeson et al., How the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement
Could Undermine PHARMAC and Threaten Access to Affordable Medicines and
Health Equity in New Zealand, 112 HEALTH POL’Y 227, 232 (2013).
190
We contacted the Ministry for further information regarding the calculation
of its costs but did not receive a response.
191
See generally GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION 19–64 (2003) (documenting the complex interactions between private firms and governments in WTO disputes); Daniel C. Esty,
We the People: Civil Society and the World Trade Organization, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 87, 93–99
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The emphasis is strongly on disciplining state regulation of
markets, and the FTA practice by the United States and European Union has carried this agenda forward.
But environmental and labor treaties also regularly include
procedural requirements for domestic regulatory decisionmaking in order to advance their substantive goals.192 The
place of environmental and labor concerns in international economic agreements and the inclusion of procedural provisions
to address them have been contested.193 Starting with NAFTA,
however, U.S. trade agreements have included chapters on labor and the environment, largely as a political price to be paid
to domestic coalitions of what Suzanne Berger has called “turtle defenders and Teamsters.”194 Since then, U.S. and EU FTAs
typically include general procedural commitments that can be
invoked by environmental and social interests. These arrangements, however, often lack the level of legalization found in the
provisions for economic actors and fail to address the collective
action problems faced by diffuse public interests. Enforcement
under these agreements ultimately relies on institutionalized
variants of diplomatic protection without direct means of legal
accountability.195 The relatively strong provisions in the 2006
(Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quack eds., 2000) (discussing the influence of
business interests and civil society at the WTO).
192
See, e.g., Aarhus Convention, supra note 98, at art. 6 (concerning public
participation in decision-making); CAFTA-DR, supra note 86, at art. 16.3 (concerning procedural guarantees and public awareness regarding the parties’ labor
laws). But see César A. Rodrı́guez-Garavito, Global Governance and Labor Rights:
Codes of Conduct and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories in
Mexico and Guatemala, 33 POL. & SOC’Y 203, 220–27 (2005) (giving an empirical
account of the limits of transparency as an instrument of governance).
193
For discussions on environmental issues, see generally Daniel C. Esty,
Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (2001); Robert
Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal
Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491 (2002);
Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329 (1992). For discussions on labor
issues, see generally MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22823, OVERVIEW
OF LABOR ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (2016) (giving a descriptive overview of U.S. practice on trade-labor linkages); Alvaro Santos, The Lessons
of TPP and The Future of Labor Chapters, in MEGAREGULATION CONTESTED: GLOBAL
ECONOMIC ORDERING AFTER TPP (Benedict Kingsbury et al. eds., forthcoming 2019)
(on file with authors).
194
Suzanne Berger, Globalization Survived Populism Once Before—and It Can
Again, BOS. REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), http://bostonreview.net/class-inequality/suzanne-berger-globalization-survived-populism [https://perma.cc/5HZS-Z75Q].
See generally J. Samuel Barkin, Trade and Environment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 445–52 (Lisa L. Martin ed.,
2015).
195
The reliance on diplomatic protection has, in effect, meant very little enforcement. See, e.g., TPP Text Analysis: The Environment Chapter Fails to Protect
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U.S.-Peru Forestry Annex establish a high-water mark that has
not been matched since.
To get the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
through Congress, President Clinton negotiated two side agreements, one on labor issues and one on the environment. The
latter, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) included a new procedure for private persons
and organizations in Canada, Mexico, and the United States to
petition a newly created Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) to review a party’s alleged failure to effectively
enforce its domestic environmental laws.196 Upon receiving a
valid submission and the implicated government’s response,
the CEC secretariat can ask the three governments to vote on
whether to prepare a factual record. Many proposals do not
obtain the first vote; no factual record is created.197 Further,
the parties appear informally to have agreed not to resort to
dispute settlement even if a record reveals persistent failures to
enforce environmental laws and have taken steps to ensure
that the CEC’s Secretariat does not become an advocate for
environmental protection.198 It is accordingly unsurprising
that this arrangement has been ineffective.199
the Environment, SIERRA CLUB 7–8 (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.sierraclub.org/
sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/uploads-wysiwig/tpp-analysis-updated.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SC6P-DPNF] (“[T]he state-state dispute settlement mechanism
for environmental provisions in all U.S. trade agreements since 2007 has failed to
produce a single formal case against documented environmental violations.”).
196
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation art. 14.1, Sept.
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1483 [hereinafter NAAEC]. This illustrates a ‘fire alarm’
model of enforcement which, contrary to the ‘police patrol’ model of continuous
oversight of agents’ compliance, relies on the ability of government to use information already held or easily discoverable by private actors leading to overall lower
administrative costs. See Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the
NAAEC, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 407 (2004).
197
Interview with employee of CEC (Oct. 25, 2016).
198
Victor Lichtinger, Remarks at JPAC Roundtable Discussion on The Roles of
the NAAEC and of the CEC: Original Intent and Evolution Over the Last 23 Years,
COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION (Nov. 9, 2017), http://www.cec.org/content/
jpac-9-november-2017 [https://perma.cc/H2BY-UWQY]. There has never been a
state-to-state dispute settlement proceeding. See also Ten-Year Review and Assessment Committee, Report of the Ten-Year Review and Assessment Committee:
Ten Years of North American Environmental Cooperation, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION 42 (June 15, 2004) http://www3.cec.org/islandora/en/item/
11382-ten-years-north-american-environmental-cooperation-report-ten-year-re
view-and-assessment-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y65J-A49Y].
199
Geoffrey Garver, Forgotten Promises: Neglected Environmental Provisions of
the NAFTA and the NAAEC, in NAFTA AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: HISTORY,
EXPERIENCE, AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 30 (Hoi L. Kong & L. Kinvin Wroth eds.,
2015) (“[T]he governments’ mostly tepid responses to factual records to date suggest this is not a particularly promising means to hold the Parties to account for
weak enforcement. The NAAEC does not require a government that is the subject
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The 2006 U.S.-Peru FTA’s Annex on Forest Sector Governance was the result of significant lobby efforts by environmental interest groups to Democrat lawmakers after the 2006 U.S.
midterm elections, which gave them the majority in both chambers of Congress.200 Innovative and highly targeted, it requires
Peru to reform not only its regulatory processes, but also its
institutions.201 Peru needs to increase the number of enforcement personnel to protect indigenous areas from illegal logging,202 develop an “anti-corruption plan” for officials charged
with protecting the forests,203 and create an independent
agency, OSINFOR, to supervise verification of all timber concessions and permits.204 While it is playing an important role
in tracking illegal logging, it has also been facing public pro-

of a factual record to take any action or to respond in any other way following its
publication. Despite calls to make some kind of commitment to follow up on
factual records, the council has stated firmly in the past that the follow-up to
factual records is a matter of domestic policy of the individual governments.”).
200
Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Annex 18.3.4 (Annex on Forest
Sector Governance), Apr. 12, 2006 [hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA]. The global regulation of forest conservation and commercialization has generated innovative governance structures, relying in important part on procedures. See, e.g., Sikina
Jinnah, Strategic Linkages: The Evolving Role of Trade Agreements in Global Environmental Governance, 20 J. ENVTL & DEV. 191, 194–95 (2011) (discussing the
novelty of the U.S.-Peru TPA and presenting some, if inconclusive, evidence on the
agreement’s effects on the trade in endangered bigleaf mahogony); Christine
Overdevest & Jonathan Zeitlin, Assembling an Experimentalist Regime: Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest Sector, 8 REG. & GOV’T 22, 23 (2014);
Shaffer, supra note 3, at 6 (“For example, the EU created a Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative in 2003 which engages developing
countries in Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) to create export licensing
systems to control for illegally harvested timber, and the U.S. amended the Lacey
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2012) in 2008 to criminalize the import of logs that
violate export country laws.”); 2007 EIA ANN. REP. 8 (2007), https://issuu.com/
eia-global/docs/eia.annualreport_p16 [https://perma.cc/N86V-2VGW]; U.S.
COMMITTEE ON FIN., No. 110-249. UNITED STATES-PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT
IMPLEMENTATION ACT 34 (Dec. 14, 2007) (describing the forest sector annex).
201
U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 200, at arts. 18.7, 18.8.
202
U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 200, at Annex 18.3.4 (Annex on Forest Sector
Governance) § 3(a)(i).
203
Id. § 3(a)(ii).
204
Id. § 3(g)(iii) (“OSINFOR shall be an independent and separate agency”);
see also Matt Finer et al., Logging Concessions Enable Illegal Logging Crisis in the
Peruvian Amazon, 4 SCI. REP. 1, 2 (2014) (asserting that this was implemented in
2008 when OSINFOR “gained greater independence” by being placed within the
Presidency of the Council of Ministers). But Finer and others argue that “lack of
oversight and enforcement prior to OSINFOR inspections” makes the established
certification regime ineffective. Id. (emphasis added). Private actors are not given
an independent procedure to ask for review. See id. at 4; OSINFOR, Organismo de
Supervisión de los Recursos Forestales y de Fauna Silvestre, https://
www.osinfor.gob.pe [https://perma.cc/DE8V-JMZT].
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tests with banners claiming that “[OSINFOR] works for the
gringos.”205
The Forestry Annex includes a complex set of procedures
for Peru’s forest regulatory practices. To combat illegal logging,
Peru is required to implement “a competitive and transparent
process to award concessions”206 and to publicize the approved
concession plans.207 The agreement further requires Peru to
take into account comments from private actors when undertaking to strengthen oversight and enforcement mechanisms
and to establish a public commenting procedure for any requirements of the Annex.208 A transnationally operating civil
society group—the Environmental Inspection Agency (EIA) has
made use of the published information to identify more than
one hundred shipments of illegally logged cedar and bigleaf
mahogany to the United States209 While showing the value of
information access, the investigation also revealed that the government systematically approved cutting bigleaf mahogany in
places where it did not in fact exist, which allowed traders to
pair the granted approvals with illegally cut trees to “launder”
them as legal for purposes for U.S. export.210 This led some to
argue that the FTA’s governance structure for cutting and trading timber enables rather than restricts illegal logging.211
The treaty further commits Peru to permit U.S. officials to
join in Peruvian site visits of exporters and producers.212 This
commitment represents a significant innovation in international treaties dealing with natural resources management, facilitating intergovernmental actions to police and correct
implementation shortfalls as a complement to privately initiated procedures; our international extension of the McNollgast
framework presumed that such strong oversight mechanisms
would commonly be off-limits in relations between sovereign
states. The potential for the U.S. government’s role was further
205
Richard Conniff, Chasing the Illegal Loggers Looting the Amazon Forest,
WIRED (Oct. 24, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/on-the-trail-ofthe-amazonian-lumber-thieves/ [https://perma.cc/8NPW-FB3G].
206
U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 200, at Annex 18.3.4 (Annex on Forest Sector
Governance) § 3(g)(i).
207
Id. § 3(g)(ii).
208
Id. §§ 19 & 3(h)(i).
209
ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, THE LAUNDERING MACHINE: HOW FRAUD
AND CORRUPTION IN PERU’S CONCESSION SYSTEM ARE DESTROYING THE FUTURE OF ITS
FORESTS 33, 37 (2012).
210
Id. at 33.
211
Finer et al., supra note 204, at 1; Sierra Club, supra note 195, at 4.
212
U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 200, at Annex 18.3.4 (Annex on Forest Sector
Governance) § 10(b).
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strengthened by the United States implementing legislation for
the U.S.-Peru FTA, which established an Interagency Committee on Trade in Timber Products from Peru.213 The Committee,
like the CEC Commission, retains wide discretion regarding
these investigative and enforcement activities.214 It is solely for
the Committee to decide what action, if any, will be taken once
they receive a verification or audit report.215 In an unprecedented action, in 2016, the Committee found that a shipment
of timber to the United States from a specific company was
unlawful.216 In late 2017, the Committee directed the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection to deny entry to shipments
from a specific Peruvian company for three years.217
213
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Public Law No. 110-138, § 501 (2007). Section 501 is the primary statutory authority
for the Interagency Committee. The Interagency Committee was established by
Presidential Memorandum dated May 1, 2009. Section 501 of the United StatesPeru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, 74 Fed Reg. 20,865 (May 1,
2009). The five-member Interagency Committee is chaired by the USTR and includes representatives from Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture,
Department of Interior, and Department of State. Representatives from the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Agency for International Development have observer status. See Interagency Comm. on Trade in Timber Prods.
From Peru, Description of the Organization, Functions, and Internal Procedures of
the Interagency Committee, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 10,
2011), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/Countries%20Regions/afri
ca/agreements/pdfs/FTAs/peru/DOC.PDF [https://perma.cc/D25S-CUXV].
214
To fulfill its function to monitor Peru’s progress, the Committee can demand audits of traders and verifications of shipments from the Peruvian government. See Interagency Comm. on Trade in Timber Prods. From Peru, supra note
213. The Committee encourages “the involvement of interested persons” and the
public can submit information to assist in establishing any violations of forest
protection rules and regulations. Id. Crucially, however, the “submission of information to the Interagency Committee in this regard does not create any substantive or procedural rights with respect to the Interagency Committee’s deliberations
or determinations.” Id. This governance structure ultimately retains all control of
managing the process for the government. Private interests are information providers and initiators but have no independent ability to advance the process. The
pathway to escalating potential conflict leads to traditional state-to-state dispute
settlement. See infra at subpart IV.C.
215
See Interagency Comm. on Trade in Timber Prods. From Peru, supra note
213.
216
Interagency Comm. on Trade in Timber Prods. from Peru, Statement Regarding July 2016 Timer Verification Report From Peru, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 17, 2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TimberCommittee-Report-8172016.pdf [https://perma.cc/R54X-2BY3]. See generally
Todd Tucker, Enforcing Environmental Rules in Trade Shows Politicization’s Benefits, ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (Oct. 24, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/enforcingenvironmental-rules-trade-shows-politicizations-benefit/ [https://perma.cc/
25ZE-XXN2] (discussing positive aspect of the “politicization” of trade enforcement under the Trump administration).
217
USTR Announces Unprecedented Action to Block Illegal Timber Imports from
Peru, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 2017), https://ustr.gov/
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The Forestry Annex illustrates that environmental groups
can succeed in changing resource management by focusing on
a specific issue, mobilizing strong congressional support, and
securing institutional changes in addition to procedural
rights.218 Subsequent trade agreements, including TPP, have,
however, been limited to generic procedural requirements and
are much weaker. This history indicates the limitations of governance at a distance, and the stark contrast in strength of
legalization between provisions that favor transnationally active firms on the one hand, and those that deal with environmental and labor interests on the other.
III
VARIATION IN LEGALIZATION OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY
PROCEDURES: EXAMPLES FROM THE TPP
The TPP, as signed by the United States and eleven other
countries in February 2016, was a high point in the use of
treaty-based administrative procedures and a major attempt
by the U.S. to “export” its regulatory capitalist model of statemarket relations and administrative governance across the Pacific. Most of TPP’s features were retained as part of CPTPP,
which Japan revived in 2017, and which was signed in March
2018.219 The agreement includes more than one hundred commitments to various regulatory procedures.220 The content of
the CPTPP, which incorporates almost all of the initial TPP
agreement wholesale and then suspends a series of provisions
listed in an annex, cannot be understood without accounting
for the U.S. as the major protagonist of the basic agreement—a
treaty among the eleven parties negotiated from a blank slate
would certainly look different. Nonetheless, the resilience of
the treaty’s procedural machinery suggests that this approach
has considerable attractions as a technique of international
regulatory ordering that does not depend on the United States
as its agent.
A focus on variations in the procedural provisions in the
thirty-chapter TPP—as well as on some of the CPTPP’s suspensions—is particularly useful to illustrate our political economy
account. Many other variables such as different time periods,
about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/october/ustr-announ
ces-unprecedented-action [https://perma.cc/AP7J-M558].
218
See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 200, at Annex 18.3.4 (Annex on Forest
Sector Governance).
219
See CPTPP, supra note 9.
220
A table of all these commitments will be made accessible upon publication.
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treaty templates, and parties, are held constant. We use the
analytical machinery developed in Part I to explain the systematic asymmetries in the procedures that TPP requires for economic regulatory decision-making on the one hand, and for
social regulation (environment and labor) on the other. This
unevenness is likely to be at least partly explained by the
McNollgast framework and Putnam’s two-level negotiating
structure, where the relative strength of the procedural commitments negotiated by the more powerful parties reflect the
relative political influence of various constituencies with the
political principals.221 We contrast the intellectual property
and environmental procedural provisions of the agreement to
illustrate these imbalances.
We analyze variations in the procedural provisions in TPP
in terms of their strength, using the concept of international
legalization developed by Abbott et al., which classifies international commitments according to three variables: obligation,
precision, and delegation.222 These categories are proxies for
how effective the inter-state commitments will be in practice.
Without empirically examining the impact of different procedural provisions on substantive regulatory outcomes, we posit
that more highly legalized procedural provisions will, on balance, make more of a difference in national regulatory
practices.
First, treaties vary in intensity of obligations, with less intense obligations being conditional, contingent on national law,
or merely hortatory.223 The intensity of an obligation is reflected in the use of different words such as ‘shall,’ ‘should,’
221

Putnam, Two-Level Games, supra note 7, at 435–36.
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401,
401 (2000) (developing obligation, precision, and delegation as three dimensions
of international legalization) [hereinafter Kenneth W. Abbott et al.]; see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (2000).
223
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., supra note 222, at 408–12. Hortatory language
features prominently in the TPP. Judge Dillard’s statement in his separate opinion in the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council is usefully recalled: “multilateral treaties establishing functioning institutions frequently contain
articles that represent ideals and aspirations which, being hortatory, are not
considered to be legally binding except by those who seek to apply them to the
other fellow.” Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v.
Pakistan), Judgment, 1972 I.C.J. Rep. 92, 107 n.1 (Aug. 18) (separate opinion by
Dillard, J.). Because we are primarily concerned with inter-state commitments
taking the treaty form, the obligations we analyze already entail a significant
degree of legalization on the spectrum between “hard” and “soft” law. The degree
of legalization can, however, vary enormously between different norms within the
same or across different treaties—it is this variation we focus on to illustrate our
argument. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., supra note 222, at 405.
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‘may,’ etc.224 Linos and Pegram show how such formulations
have real effects on state behavior.225 Second, commitments
vary in precision—they can be clear and specific or broad and
ambiguous.226 The level of precision influences the range of
plausible interpretations and the discretion of the obligee.227 A
third dimension of variation is delegation—the extent of discretion granted to third-party institutions with respect to the interpretation, application, and implementation, of international
commitments.228 Authority can be delegated both to courts or
tribunals for dispute resolution and treaty institutions for implementation.229 For our purposes, it is the delegation of dispute resolution and enforcement to institutions independent of
the regulatory agency with procedural obligations that is of
interest.230 Variation in the three dimensions is relevant for
legal obligations’ effectiveness and hence their potential force
as instruments of transnational control.
A. TPP on Medicines: Strong Procedures to Empower
Originator Drug Companies
There are many instruments of global governance relevant
for the regulation of pharmaceuticals including the guidelines
of the World Health Organization (WHO);231 cooperation agreements between national regulatory agencies;232 WTO rules relating to intellectual property rights, foremost in the TRIPS
agreement;233 and importantly, also a large set of more recent
bilateral and regional economic agreements.234
224

See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., supra note 222, 408–12.
Katerina Linos & Tom Pegram, The Language of Compromise in International Agreements, 70 INT’L ORG. 587, 587 (2016) (“If flexibly specifying a task is no
different from omitting it altogether, as our data suggest, the costs of compromise
are much greater than previously believed.”).
226
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., supra note 222, at 412–15.
227
Id. at 415.
228
Id. at 415–18.
229
Id. at 418.
230
Id. at 415–18.
231
See Richard Laing et al., 25 Years of the WHO Essential Medicines Lists:
Progress and Challenges, 361 LANCET 1723, 1725 (2003).
232
See John Skerritt et al., Regulatory Collaboration: The International Coalition of Medicines Regulatory Authorities (ICMRA), 29 WHO DRUG INFO. 3, 4 (2015).
233
See generally GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS (2012).
234
See Abbott, supra note 167, at 47 (tracing the genealogy of U.S. FTA practice protecting the originator pharmaceutical industry). The relation between
access to medicines and international agreements concerning intellectual property has received abundant attention. For an innovative approach to these issues,
see generally BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROP-
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The battle between intellectual property protections and
access to medicines played out in the original TPP negotiations,
and the suspension of some of its provisions in CPTPP.235 We
expect that in TPP12 procedural commitments would stack the
deck in favor of the originator pharmaceutical industry, a wellorganized powerful constituency with strong political influence
in the two dominant parties—the United States and Japan.236
After the United States dropped out, notable provisions in the
intellectual property chapter were suspended in CPTPP.237
These were mostly substantive provisions, whereas the procedural obligations largely survived.238 This comports with our
hypothesis about procedural commitments on balance being
less politically salient.
The TPP’s procedural obligations relevant to pharmaceuticals span the chapters on technical barriers to trade, government procurement, regulatory coherence, transparency, anticorruption, as well as specific annexes about pharmaceuticals
and devices. Considered together, they are intense, specific,
and strong in their institutions for implementation.
TPP includes a diverse array of procedural rights for patent
applicants and holders, including prioritization of earlier applications,239 the right to amend filings,240 and information about
ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & César
Rodrı́guez-Garavito eds., 2014).
235
See Gleeson et al., supra note 189, at 2 (focusing on the effects of TPP’s
procedural requirements on health regulation in New Zealand); Amy Kapczynski,
The Trans-Pacific Partnership—Is It Bad for Your Health?, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED.
201, 202 (2015) (noting the negative impact that the TPP could have on public
health, including the increased cost of medicine in the US). Gleeson et al., supra
note 189, at 230.
236
According to Abbott, the relative influence of originator and generic pharmaceutical industries helps understand variations in the U.S. Abbott, supra note
167, at 53. The weaker obligations in the US-Chile and US-Jordan FTAs may be
linked to the important generic industries there, rather than a stronger emphasis
on public health concerns. Id. The strong influence of the pharmaceutical industry over U.S. trade policy is well documented. See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE
POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 147 (2008)
(describing pharmaceutical companies’ strategies to influence U.S. trade policy);
Kaminski, supra note 46, at 1001, 1051 (explaining that unbalanced membership
in advisory committees results in “trade policy [that] does not produce balanced IP
law”).
237
Annex II—List of Suspended Provisions, GOV’T OF CAN., http://
www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerci
aux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/annex2-annexe2.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/SXS2WPYW].
238
Id.
239
See TPP12, supra note 2, at art. 18.42 (2016).
240
Id. at art. 18.43.
ERTY AND
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granted patents.241 Particularly pronounced are TPP’s obligations for domestic opportunities for judicial review. The parties
are, for example, to “ensure that any marketing authorisation
determination is subject to an appeal or review process that
may be invoked at the request of the applicant.”242 Broad in
scope are also the requirements to provide “right holders” with
“civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of any
intellectual property right covered in this Chapter.”243 By creating a presumption of patent validity in patent disputes, TPP
specifies the burden of proof in a manner beneficial for the
pharmaceutical industry.244
The TPP not only provides for extensive opportunities for
review but in some instances, demands specific remedies. The
parties must enable patent holders to recover monetary damages from alleged infringers for losses suffered due to negligent
or willful behavior, and damages include lost profits.245 The
parties are also required to give their courts the ability to force
alleged patent infringers to provide information so as to facilitate patent holders’ ability to make a successful claim.246
In keeping with recent U.S. FTAs, the TPP requires parties
which allow the use of previously submitted safety and efficacy
data in market approval applications—which are used by producers of generic drugs to cut approval costs—to set up a procedure linking the medicines registration process with the
opportunity for patent review.247 Modeled on U.S. legislation,
this procedure creates a dynamic in which the regulatory
agency for approving medicines assists originator pharmaceutical firms with patent enforcement by automatically notifying
them of potential challenges to their patents.248 This notification is backed up by guaranteeing “preliminary injunctions or
equivalent effective provisional measures” to keep the new
product, in many cases a generic, from entering the market by
creating a relatively easily erected hurdle at the disposal of
241

Id. at art. 18.45.
Id. at Annex 8-C, ¶ 12(c).
243
Id. at art. 18.74, ¶ 1.
244
Id. at art. 18.72, ¶ 3.
245
Id. at art. 18.74, ¶ 3–4.
246
Id. at art. 18.74, ¶ 13.
247
Id. at art. 18.53, ¶ 1(b) (requiring parties to give notice to the patent holder
the data of which is being used and adequate time to seek review including
preliminary injunctions).
248
Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 303, 307 (2008) (pointing
to the creation of the patent/registration linkage system in the Hatch-Waxman
Act).
242
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originator firms.249 This system of linkage—which is of highpriority for the originator drug industry—is a strong and precise obligation which illustrates the potential for treaty-based
procedural commitments to function as instruments of control
at a distance.250 There might of course be significant slippage
between the obligations in the treaty and the functioning of the
administrative and judicial processes as they are ultimately
implemented. The procedural rights in the treaty are not necessarily a guarantor of different substantive outcomes, but
their significance lies in their direct empowerment of private
individuals to directly assert their interests. If the procedural
rights themselves are flouted, we would expect the private actors to seek redress through the review mechanisms created by
the treaty and by lobbying their home country to influence the
regulating state.
As Frederick Abbott notes, the linkage system also illustrates the de facto imbalance which de jure equal and reciprocal international commitments can entail.251 The delay to the
market entry of generic drugs created by the preliminary injunction procedure depends on the efficiency of the local state’s
administrative or judicial system.252
U.S. bilateral agreements with comparatively weaker IP obligations, such as the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Jordan FTAs, have
been linked to the influence of important generic industries in
those countries, rather than stronger support for public health
concerns.253

249

See TPP12, supra note 2, at art. 18.53, ¶ 1(c); see also THE GLOBALIZATION
HEALTH CARE: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 308–09 (I. Glenn Cohen ed., 2013)
(discussing the rationale of patent linkage).
250
PhRMA, Re: Request for Comments on Negotiating Objectives Regarding
Modernization of The North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and
Mexico 4 (June 12, 2017), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/files/dmfile/PhRMAComments-on-Negotiating-Objectives-for-Modernization-of-NAFTA-June2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3V7-TQ82].
251
See Abbott, supra note 167, at 55–56.
252
In countries with lower state capacity, proceedings challenging the granted
preliminary injunctions are more likely to be delayed which in fact creates further
protection for the originator drug from the generic competitor. Id. at 56 (“Linkage
presents the largest scale problem for the countries with the least well developed
legal systems: countries where preliminary injunctions may last for a decade
because there is no one that can effectively challenge them.”).
253
Id. at 53. As we noted earlier, TPP12 had also included—and CPTPP subsequently suspended—detailed procedural commitments relating to central health
authorities deciding on reimbursement schedules for medicines. See supra subpart II.C.
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B. TPP on Environment: Weak Procedures to Appease
Environmental Interests
The evolution of environmental norms in U.S. economic
treaties continued in TPP12, which features a total of 136 different environmental provisions, only two of which were not
copied from previous agreements.254 CPTPP left almost all of
the environment chapter intact but suspended one obligation—
similar to that of the U.S. Logan Act—which requires the treaty
parties to take measures against trade in wild fauna and flora
that violates not a party’s own law but that of the jurisdiction
where the original taking occurred.255 In terms of legalization,
the environmental obligations in the treaty were significantly
diluted from the corresponding provisions of the 2006 U.S.Peru agreement, previously discussed.256 Among the reasons
for the scaling back may have been the greater need to compromise among twelve treaty parties and the absence of strong
environmental demands in the U.S. Congress’s TPP “fast-track”
legislative process.257
The TPP’s procedural obligations relevant to environmental
protection span the chapters on technical barriers to trade,258
investment,259 government procurement,260 exceptions,261 and
of course, the environment. But overall, the provisions remain
weak and do not give private actors significant rights to protect
their interests. The environment chapter requires the parties
to “make publicly available appropriate information about its
programmes and activities” relating to the protection of the
ozone layer, the protection of the marine environment from
ship pollution, and the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity,262 as well as to generally publish their environmental laws and policies.263 But in contrast to the
pharmaceuticals provisions giving private actors extensive and
enforceable access to information rights, TPP’s sole specific informational provision requires the parties’ governments to
254
Jean Frédéric Morin, Joost Pauwelyn & James Hollway, The Trade Regime
as a Complex Adaptive System: Exploration and Exploitation of Environmental
Norms in Trade Agreements, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 365, 383 (2017).
255
GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 237.
256
SIERRA CLUB, supra note 195, at 7–8.
257
Id. at 1, 8.
258
See TPP12, supra note 2, at art. 8.7, ¶ 10.
259
Id. at arts. 9.10, ¶ 3(d); 9.16.
260
Id. at art. 15.3, ¶ 2.
261
Id. at art. 29.1, ¶ 2.
262
Id. at arts. 20.5, ¶ 2; 20.6, ¶ 2; 20.13, ¶ 5.
263
Id. at art. 20.7, ¶ 1.
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share data about their fishing subsidies with each other.264
Even though information asymmetries abound in environmental protection, and many civil society organizations could benefit greatly from access to credible information about
environmental conditions and proposed regulatory measures,
the TPP’s generic publication requirements fail to ensure that
such information will be forthcoming; they give wide discretion
to governments as to what information to publish, and lack any
private rights of access.265 Administrative hearings are to be
public only “in accordance with [a party’s] applicable laws.”266
A number of procedural provisions do not specify standing but
leave it to domestic law to establish which interests are “recognized.”267 There are also no obligations for reason-giving, and
the remedies provision is only hortatory.268
The TPP’s provisions regarding enforcement concern both
the TPP’s obligations, and the parties’ own environmental laws
and regulations. With respect to the agreement’s obligations,
TPP provides a public submissions procedure which requires
each party to receive and consider written submissions about
implementation of the environment chapter.269 This procedure
is only required for “person[s] residing or established in its
territory” thereby excluding submission rights from foreign civil
society organizations, while the participation provisions in the
pharmaceutical context were not so restricted.270 Once eligible
interested persons have made the submission, the party is required only to “respond in a timely manner . . . in accordance
with domestic procedures.”271 This is weak and unspecific.
Furthermore, the provision explicitly lists restrictive conditions
264
Id. at art. 20.16, ¶ 9 (providing information about the subsidies for fisheries programs).
265
See, e.g., id. at art. 20.7, ¶ 1 (“Each Party shall promote public awareness
of its environmental laws and policies, including enforcement and compliance
procedures, by ensuring that relevant information is available to the public.”); see
also id. at art. 20.3, ¶ 2 (“The Parties recognise the sovereign right of each Party to
establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and its own environmental priorities, and to establish, adopt or modify its environmental laws and
policies accordingly.”); id. at art. 20.3, ¶ 5 (“The Parties recognise that each Party
retains the right to exercise discretion and to make decisions regarding: (a) investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory and compliance matters; and (b) the allocation
of environmental enforcement resources with respect to other environmental laws
determined to have higher priorities.”).
266
Id. at art. 20.7, ¶ 3.
267
Id. at art. 20.7, ¶ 4.
268
Id. at art. 20.7, ¶ 5.
269
Id. at art. 20.9.
270
Id. at art. 20.7, ¶ 2.
271
Id. at art. 20.9, ¶ 1.
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the parties may impose for public submissions.272 Interested
persons do not have the right to petition parties to correct
regulatory inaction—this right is reserved only for the other
parties.273 This inter-party exchange is administered through
the Committee on Environment where private actors have no
right of access.274 In contrast to the U.S.-Peru FTA, where a
partially independent secretariat can create a public factual
record on the basis of submissions,275 the TPP does not include
any possibility for further public information creation.276
The second set of provisions concerns the enforcement of
the parties’ own environmental laws.277 In comparison to both
previous FTAs and the pharmaceutical provisions in the TPP,
these procedural obligations are weak and unspecific.278 A restrictive clause was added, for example, which only gives the
right to request investigation of alleged environmental law violations to persons “residing or established in its territory.”279
Similarly, TPP provides that enforcement proceedings for a
country’s environmental laws must be public only to the extent
this publicity is “in accordance with its applicable laws.”280
In sum, the numerous TPP procedural provisions relating
to the environment do not provide effective instruments for
affecting regulatory decisions. They do not empower represent272

Id. at art. 20.9, ¶ 2.
Id. at art. 20.9, ¶ 4.
274
Id.
275
U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 200, at art. 18.9.
276
The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Environment: An Assessment of Commitments and Trade Agreement Enforcement, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L. 5 (Nov. 2015),
http://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/TPP-Enforcement-AnalysisNov2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRL8-K6UT] (criticizing the absence of a factual
record). The creation of a factual record had been part of the commitments in the
NAFTA environment side-agreement, CAFTA-DR, the PTPA, U.S-Columbia PTA
and U.S.-Panama PTA. Even in these treaties, the citizen suits have not been able
to generate much factual records—of the 87 filed submissions, 22 generated
records. Id. at 5–6.
277
See TPP12, supra note 2, at art. 20.7, ¶¶ 2–5.
278
Compare id. at art. 20.7, ¶ 2 (“Each Party shall ensure that an interested
person residing or established in its territory may request that the Party’s competent authorities investigate alleged violations of its environmental laws, and that
the competent authorities give those requests due consideration, in accordance
with the Party’s law.”), with id. at art. 18.71 (“Each Party shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Section are available under its law so as
to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property
rights covered by this Chapter, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies that constitute a deterrent to future infringements.”).
279
Compare id. at art. 20.7, ¶ 2, with U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 200, at art.
18.4, ¶ 1.
280
Compare TPP12, supra note 2, at art. 20.7, ¶ 3, with U.S.-Peru FTA, supra
note 200, at art. 18.4, ¶ 2(a).
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atives of environmental interests, do not stack the deck in their
favor, and leave pre-existing power imbalances in place.
Rather than giving environmental advocates the rights of initiative and voice, the agreement vacuously provides that the state
parties “may seek advice or assistance from any person or body
they deem appropriate in order to examine [disagreements relating to the environment chapter].”281 Relatedly, in setting up
committees, advisory committees, and fora for exchange on
environmental matters, the parties “may include persons with
relevant experience, as appropriate, including experience in
business, natural resource conservation and management, or
other environmental matters.”282
A last weakness regarding environmental enforcement in
TPP is its complex and protracted inter-party dispute resolution process.283 In cases of disagreement about interpretation
or implementation of the TPP environment chapter, the parties
are to seek consultations.284 The consultations have three
stages. First, consultation, then “senior consultation,” and
then “ministerial consultation,” before you can get to SSDS.285
The practical effect of these elaborate requirements is to foreclose, or at least, to greatly discourage the parties from resorting to the TPP’s SSDS process. In contrast to the Peru treaty,
no autonomous secretariat to oversee the enforcement process
exists, leading some commentators to question whether “parties seriously intend to comply with environmental commitments in [trade agreements].”286
CONCLUSION
Over the past three decades, the North Atlantic states’ regulatory capitalist approach to global economic governance has
proliferated and intensified through economic regulatory agreements designed, through procedural as well as substantive
commitments, to promote international commerce.287 Lately
this approach has come to draw resistance, not only from some
developing countries and China, but from home. In the United
States and the European Union, major critiques of ever increasing international mobility of trade, services, and invest281
282
283
284
285
286
287

TPP12, supra note 2, at art. 20.20, ¶ 5.
Id. at art. 20.8, ¶ 2.
SSDS is available pursuant to id. at art. 20.23, ¶ 1.
Id. at 20.23, ¶ 2(a).
Id. at arts. 20.20–23.
CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL L., supra note 276, at 8.
Putnam, Two-Level Games, supra note 7, at 427–30.
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ment have become politically powerful.288 The adverse, often
locally concentrated, and highly varying impacts on employment and the environment have spurred significant contestation and resistance.289 China, which benefitted enormously
from integrating more closely into the global market, is now
simultaneously pursuing a quite different approach to international economic ordering through its highly ambitious Belt and
Road Initiative which focuses on—but reaches much wider
than—infrastructures.290
A marked difference has existed between the liberal model
of private party empowering procedures in EU- and U.S.-led
agreements on one hand, and in agreements with strong ownership from ASEAN or China on the other.291 The United
States has been intending to export procedures that it already
has in place domestically, whereas many of the ASEAN governments and China do not want to bind their governments and
empower private actors to the same extent. It remains to be
seen to what extent China’s alternative model for internal and
global economic ordering built around a close connection, if not
identity, of state and economic actors and the leveraging of
government investment in other countries will be the foundation for an entirely different system of transnational control.
Notwithstanding these diverse sources of contestation, the
unbundling and reorganization of production and distribution
along global value chains through technological innovation,
strong growth in cross-border investment and services, and the
revolution of the digital economy are here to stay. These dynamic forms of transnational economic activity will generate
288
See Krishnadev Calamur, The ‘Brexit’ Campaign: A Cheat Sheet, ATLANTIC
(June 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/06/
uk-brexit-guide/482730/ [https://perma.cc/74RA-EYU3].
289
See id.; see also David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The
China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8
ANNUAL REV. ECON. 205, 205–09 (2016).
290
See Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57
HARV. INT’L L.J. 261, 323–24 (2016). See generally REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?:
THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM (Curtis J. Milhaupt &
Benjamin Liebman eds., 2016).
291
See, e.g., Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China art. 4, Nov. 29, 2004 (“Article X
of the GATT 1994 shall, mutatis mutandis, be incorporated into and form an
integral part of this Agreement”); Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership Among Japan and Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, Apr. 14, 2008; Agreement on Trade in Goods Under the Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Among the Governments of
the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the
Republic of Korea, Aug. 24, 2006.
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strong continuing demand for market-oriented economic regulation and open procedures for regulatory governance. The
question ahead, we think, is how this demand will be satisfied—by which actors, through which institutional arrangements (public, private, or hybrid), and with what distributional
consequences. These larger themes should motivate further
analysis.
Our goal in this Article is to show the importance of treaty
commitments for domestic regulatory procedures as important
instruments of transnational control of regulatory decisionmaking. Our analysis of the two-level game dynamics further
demonstrates why procedural provisions might be particularly
attractive as technologies of transnational governance. The negotiations for these commitments have particular dynamics,
but they can serve as important venues for political contestation. In our view, the global economic order’s procedural infrastructure cannot be uncritically accepted as a means for
promoting good government and the rule of law.292 Procedures
are powerful tools for governance at a distance, which can be
marshalled by different political actors and interests for different ends.
Our analysis also shows that the current pattern of procedural provisions is structurally linked to persisting collective
action problems. As a result, business interests almost always
prevail over diffuse environmental and social interests in their
influence over treaty makers and, through the procedures
adopted by international agreements, over regulatory agencies.
Firms most experienced with the McNollgast/Putnam dynamics are likely, overall, to gain the most from procedural entitlements agreed to in treaties. By showing what treaties can and
cannot do in this area, we hope to encourage more refined
thinking from academics and civil society groups with respect
to these provisions. Vague substantive commitments in the
areas of environmental protection or labor relations may often
lead to nothing, whereas new procedural commitments specifically designed to allow meaningful and balanced representation by a variety of social interests at both the level of
international negotiations and the level of domestic regulatory
decision-making could help redress the imbalance in existing
arrangements. More careful design and innovative thinking
about specifically empowering communities through subsidized representation or changing access should be included in
292
See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 138, at 939 (describing some critical views
of WTO’s transparency and participation).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN104.txt

2018]

unknown

REMOTE CONTROL

Seq: 67

10-JAN-19

11:53

231

the toolbox.293 Our analysis also further supports the growing
call for exploring possibilities to open up the negotiation process to give meaningful participation opportunities for broader
social interests.294

293
The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control has obligations regarding the influence of the tobacco industry in setting and implementing health
policies. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, art. 5.3, entered into
force Feb. 27, 2005; WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Guidelines
for Implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control: On the Protection of Public Health Policies with Respect to Tobacco Control
from Commercial and Other Vested Interests of the Tobacco Industry, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 5–6 (Nov. 2008), http://www.who.int/fctc/treaty_instruments/
adopted/article_5_3/en/ [https://perma.cc/PZN9-VYKD] (“4.8 Parties should
not allow any person employed by the tobacco industry or any entity working to
further its interests to be a member of any government body, committee or advisory group that sets or implements tobacco control or public health policy. 4.9
Parties should not nominate any person employed by the tobacco industry or any
entity working to further its interests to serve on delegations to meetings of the
Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary bodies or any other bodies established
pursuant to decisions of the Conference of the Parties.”) (adopted by decision
FCTC/COP3(7)).
294
See generally Simon Lester, Transparency in Trade Negotiations: How Much
is Enough, How Much is Too Much?, ICTSD: BRIDGES AFRICA (Sept. 1, 2015), https:/
/www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/transparency-in-trade-negotiations-how-much-is-enough-how-much-is [https://perma.cc/8B3X-JZYD];
Trisha Shetty, Why Transparency Matters in Europe’s Trade Negotiations, ACCESS
NOW (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.accessnow.org/transparency-matters-europestrade-negotiations/ [https://perma.cc/9Y9Q-3KAJ].

